Streaming Goes Global: Analysing Global Streaming Music With EMI Insight Data

This July EMI’s Insight division launched an unprecedented initiative to share data from their 850,000 interview Global Consumer Insight data.  This dataset covers 25 countries and over 7,400 artists, with twelve people being interviewed at any given moment, 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.

The data is being shared with the data science community in a range of initiatives including  forthcoming Music Data Science Hackcamps.
As hard data continues to be something of a scarce commodity for the streaming music debate I decided to mine EMI’s dataset to create a snapshot of global streaming music adoption, and its influence on the broader music market. I have written up a report which you can download for free here.  Additionally EMI have given me permission to post the data here so that you can play around the data yourselves.  In fact I invite you to go and play around with the data and see if you can find any trends that I missed in my analysis.

Here are some of the key findings from the report (which of course, along with all of the opinions and interpretations are my own and are not, necessarily, EMI’s)

  • Streaming has a firm foothold. 32% of consumers across the globe are now using streaming services (see figure 1).  However, adoption is far from uniform.
  • Nordics lead the way. Norway and Sweden (the home of Spotify) are respectively the 1st and 3rd most active streaming markets globally.  Key to this trend is the relative sophistication of Internet users in these markets.  48% of Norwegians are now streaming music users, as are 43% of Swedes.
  • Streaming is a good fit for piracy riddled Spain.  Spain is the 2nd most active market with 44% streaming penetration.  But whereas consumer sophistication was key to Nordic adoption, in Spain piracy and the legacy of free were the most important drivers.
  • Free is a good fit for France too. The role of piracy and free have also been important in France.  French authorities have pushed through the controversial Hadopi legislation but the carrot of Spotify and local streaming success Deezer has delivered immediate results.  Translating streaming usage into purchases though is less successful: just 13%.
  • Purchase conversion rates are higher in lower penetration markets. The US, Canada, UK, Germany and Denmark have lower streaming penetration but these markets have much higher streaming-to-paid downloads conversion rates, averaging 23% of streaming users.
  • Streaming Drives Music Discovery and Consumption. Although it is still too early to draw definitive conclusions about exactly how much streaming impacts piracy and sales, the case for driving discovery and consumption is much clearer.  55% of global streaming music users state that they now discover new artists and new music as a result of streaming.
  • Usage is steady among existing users. Usage among existing streaming users is broadly steady with 19% using streaming more than 12 months previously and 20% more.

Download the complete report here.

Music Start-Up Strategy 2.0

The music industry needs innovation more than most industries and yet the last two years has seen a slowdown in the number of new licensed music services coming to market and greater consolidation around the Triple A of Apple, Android and Amazon.  In this brave new world music start-ups need an entirely new modus operandi.

There are many reasons for the slowdown in new licensed music services, but a key one is the establishment of the license-advance business model in which record labels issue licenses only upon payment of sizeable, non-repayable advances in anticipation of forecasted income.  Depending on the scale of the risk to the labels presented by the licensed service these payments can range from relatively modest to downright gargantuan (Beyond Oblivion went to the wall owing $100m to Sony and Warner Music even though not a single consumer ever saw the service).  With so few services managing to make a dent on Apple’s market share investors have grown wary of investing in music start-ups that require licenses, some have effectively stopped investing in them all together.  The labels’ focus on partners with scale (and effectively using advances as means of sorting the financially robust wheat from the chaff) may deliver near-term security for the labels but it increases their long term risk by slowing music service innovation.  Hungry young start-ups are often more likely to create transformational innovation than heavily resourced R&D divisions of billion dollar companies.  Thinking ‘out of the box’ is always a lot easier when you’re not actually in the box in the first place.

Music Start-Up Strategy 2.0 Requires A New Set of Relationships

The status quo is a lose-lose for all parties, each of whom find themselves stuck in a Catch 22: labels need new services but also the safety net of advances, services need licenses but can’t pay for the advances and investors want to invest in music services but won’t do so when advances are required.  It is time to change the model, for this cycle of insufficient innovation and market contraction to be broken.

So just how can this circle be squared? The starting point is accepting the position of each of the three constituencies and then building from there:

  • Labels want market innovation but with their market contracting they need to mitigate risk
  • Services want to innovate but can’t afford to have advances as their core early stage expense
  • Investors want to invest in music innovation but want to put as much as possible of that investment in technology and people

Music start-up strategy 2.0 requires each party to think and behave differently, to accept the fundamentals of the new digital music economy.  And this requires a willingness to both embrace some new ideas and to help forge a few others:

Record labels – become investment partners: Record labels – majors and independents alike – deserve great credit for transforming their business in the last few years, but they cannot change the market alone.  Labels need to harness open innovation, leveraging the developer ecosystem.  OpenEMI is an early model of best practice but to fulfil its massive potential the approach needs underpinning with a more equitable alignment of label-developer relationships.  Start-ups are going to help solve record labels’ problem and labels need to not just tap that expertise but accelerate it.  To do that record labels need to apply A&R rules to technology start-ups. On the artist front labels already behave like Venture Capital firms, now they need to translate this appetite for risk to their commercial strategy.  To take the same sort of risks on start-ups as they do on artists. This of course means that labels will routinely require equity stakes – and sizeable ones, but instead of just being a licensing requirement, these will be in return for a new relationship in which labels establish nurturing partnerships with young start-ups, just like those they have with artists.

When a start-up is at pre-launch stage it is probably going to be more appropriate to take a good chunk of equity for licenses than it is an advance that the start-up can ill afford.  Of course it will still be appropriate for advances to be part of the mix in some circumstances – sometimes even the majority of the mix – but the balance of the relationship should be investing to become a business partner.  This means becoming active stakeholders, sitting on boards, working with the entrepreneurs to help make them successes.  In short, the relationship should change from licensee-licensor to investment partners with shared vision and motives for success.

Start-ups – understand what labels need: Though record labels are becoming increasingly confident of their own innovation capabilities, no media company is an innovation agency while technology start-ups have innovation imperatives at their core.  Unfortunately they often get the conversations with labels wrong.  Instead of going to labels with the “we’re going to save your industry” pitch, start-ups should better understand what label priorities are and then propose working with them to help them achieve those objectives, as partners. (This is something that Spotify did incredibly well right from the start).  Just as it is best practice to engage with an investor long before they actually need money, start-ups should apply the same approach to record labels.

However this change of relationship is probably going to take some time to realize, so in the more immediate term start-ups should look at ways to deliver their experiences without licenses.  No I’m not advocating the Groove Shark approach, but instead leveraging the content licenses of digital music services that are pursuing ambitious API strategies.  Music start-ups should think hard about whether they really need to own music licenses themselves to deliver a great user experience, or at least whether they need to right away.  Building, for example, a product within the Spotify ecosystem is a great way to deliver a real-world proof-of-concept, test consumer receptivity and have immediate access to millions of potential customers.  License conversations are a lot easier with proven consumer demand on the table.  (Though start-ups need to be careful with music API strategy, indeed they should treat music service APIs like mobile OS.  Don’t put all of your eggs in one API basket.)

Investors – work with labels as partners and embrace the API economy. Investors might have some reservations about working with record labels at start-up board level but they shouldn’t fear losing influence.  The odds are investors will still make the same scale of Seed and Series A investments, it is just that their money will be working smarter, helping build great technology and hiring better people at those crucial early stages of a company’s life.  Investors and labels often find themselves on opposite sides of the argument.  There is no inherent reason the relationship should be adversarial.

Investors should also think about how well their investment strategy harnesses the capabilities of the API Economy. Of course it is always preferable to invest in a business that owns all of the fuel that powers its engine.  But in the era of integrated music API’s it is no longer crucial for a music service to have its own licenses.  An investor wouldn’t expect a mobile app developer to own Android, iOS or Windows Mobile so they need not expect a music service to own music licenses.

Laying the Groundwork for Transformational Innovation

Some of these changes are already beginning to happen, others are a long way off from being realized.  But this change is needed to enable to next wave of transformational innovation that the music industry so desperately needs.  Freeing up precious and scarce early stage resources leaves start-ups able to focus on developing great, innovative technology.  Which in turn will mean better products, better user experiences and more revenue for everyone.

I first discussed some of the themes covered in this blog post in the Giga Om Pro report ‘Monetizing Music in the Post-Scarcity Age’ which can be found here

 

The Music Format Bill of Rights

Today I have published the latest Music Industry Blog report:  ‘The Music Format Bill Of Rights: A Manifesto for the Next Generation of Music Products’.  The report is currently available free of charge to Music Industry Blog subscribers.  To subscribe to this blog and to receive a copy of the report simply add your email address to the ‘EMAIL SUBSCRIPTION’ box to left.

Here are a few highlights of the report:

Synopsis

The music industry is in dire need of a genuine successor to the CD, and the download is not it. The current debates over access versus ownership and of streaming services hurting download sales ring true because a stream is a decent like-for-like replacement for a download.  The premium product needs to be much more than a mere download.  It needs dramatically reinventing for the digital age, built around four fundamental and inalienable principles of being Dynamic, Interactive, Social and Curated (D.I.S.C.).  This is nothing less than an entire new music format that will enable the next generation of music products.  Products that will be radically different from their predecessors and that will crucially be artist-specific, not store or service specific.  Rights owners will have to overcome some major licensing and commercial issues, but the stakes are high enough to warrant the effort.  At risk is the entire future of premium music products.

D.I.S.C.: The Music Format Bill Of Rights

The opportunity for the next generation of music format is of the highest order but to fulfil that potential , lessons from the current digital music market must be learned and acted upon to ensure mistakes are not repeated.  The next generation of music format needs to be dictated by the objective of meeting consumer needs, not rights owner business affairs teams’ T&Cs.  It must be defined by consumer experiences not by business models.  This next generation of music format will in fact both increase rights owner revenue (at an unprecedented rate in the digital arena) and will fuel profitable businesses.  But to do so effectively, ‘the cart’ of commercial terms, rights complexities and stakeholder concerns must follow the ‘horse’ of user experience, not lead it. This coming wave of music format must also be grounded in a number of fundamental and inalienable principles.  And so, with no further ado, welcome to the Music Format Bill of Rights (see figure):

  • Dynamic. In the physical era music formats had to be static, it was an inherent characteristic of the model.  But in the digital age in which consumers are perpetually online across a plethora of connected devices there is no such excuse for music format stasis.  The next generation of music format must leverage connectivity to the full, to ensure that relevant new content is dynamically pushed to the consumer, to make the product a living, breathing entity rather than the music experience dead-end that the download currently represents.
  • Interactive. Similarly the uni-directional nature of physical music formats and radio was an unavoidable by-product of the broadcast and physical retail paradigms.  Consumers consumed. In the digital age they participate too.  Not only that, they make content experiences richer because of that participation, whether that be by helping drive recommendations and discovery or by creating cool mash-ups. Music products must place interactivity at their core, empowering the user to fully customize their experience.  We are in the age of Media Mass Customization, the lean-back paradigm of the analogue era has been superseded by the lean-forward mode of the digital age.  If music formats don’t embrace this basic principle they will find that no one embraces them.
  • Social. Music has always been social, from the Neolithic campfire to the mixtape.  In the digital context music becomes massively social.  Spotify and Facebook’s partnering builds on the important foundations laid by the likes of Last.FM and MySpace.  Music services are learning to integrate social functionality, music products must have it in their core DNA.
  • Curated. One of the costs of the digital age is clutter and confusion: there is so much choice that there is effectively no choice at all.  Consumers need guiding through the bewildering array of content, services and features.  High quality, convenient, curated and context aware experiences will be the secret sauce of the next generation of music formats. These quasi-ethereal elements provide the unique value that will differentiate paid from free, premium from ad supported, legal from illegal.  Digital piracy means that all content is available somewhere for free.  That fight is lost, we are inarguably in the post-content scarcity age.  But a music product that creates a uniquely programmed sequence of content, in a uniquely constructed framework of events and contexts will create a uniquely valuable experience that cannot be replicated simply by putting together the free pieces from illegal sources.  The sum will be much greater than its parts.

Table of Contents for the full 20 page report:

Setting The Scene

  • Digital’s Failure To Drive a Format Replacement Cycle

Analysis

  • Setting the Scene
  • (Apparently) The Revolution Will Not Be Digitized
  • The Music Consumption Landscape is Dangerously Out of Balance
  • Tapping the Ownership Opportunity
  • The Music Format Bill Of Rights
  • Applying the Laws of Ecosystems to Music Formats
  • Building the Future of Premium Music Products
  • D.I.S.C. Products Will Be the Top Tier of Mainstream Music Products
  • The Importance of a Multi-Channel Retail Strategy
  • Learning Lessons from the Past and Present
  • We Are In the Per-Person Age, Not the Per-Device Age

Next Steps

Conclusion

The Digital Music Year That Was: 2011 in Review and 2012 Predictions

Following the disappointment of 2010, 2011 was always going to need to pack more punch.  In some ways it did, and other ways it continued to underwhelm. On balance though the stage is set for an exciting 2012.

There were certainly lots of twists and turns in 2011, including: disquiet among the artist community regarding digital pay-outs, the passing of Steve Jobs, Nokia’s return to digital music,  EMI’s API play, and of course Universal Music’s acquisition of EMI.  Here are some of the 2011 developments that have most far reaching implications:

  • The year of the ecosystems. With the launch of Facebook’s content dashboard, Android Music, the Amazon Fire (a name not designed to win over eco-warriors),  Apple’s iTunes Match and Spotify’s developer platform there was a surge in the number of competing ecosystem plays in the digital music arena.  Despite the risk of consumer confusion, some of these are exciting foundations for a new generation of music experiences.
  • Cash for cache.  The ownership versus access debate raged fully in 2011, spurred by the rise of streaming services.  Although we are in an unprecedented period of transition, ownership and access will coexist for many years yet, and tactics such as charging users for cached-streams blur the lines between streams and downloads, and in turn between rental and ownership. (The analogy becomes less like renting a movie and more like renting a flat.)
  • Subscriptions finally hit momentum.  Though the likes of rdio and MOG haven’t yet generated big user numbers Spotify certainly has, and Rhapsody’s acquisition of Napster saw the two grandaddys of the space consolidate.  Spotify hit 2.5 million paying users, Rhapsody 800,000 and Sony Music Unlimited 800,000.
  • New services started coming to market.  After a year or so of relative inactivity in the digital music service space, 2011 saw the arrival of a raft of new players including Blackberry’s BBM Music, Android Music, Muve Music , and Rara.  The momentum looks set to continue in 2012 with further new entrants such as Beyond Oblivion and psonar.
  • Total revenues still shrank.  By the end of 2011 the European and North American music markets will have shrunk by 7.8% to $13.5bn, with digital growing by 8% to reach $5 billion.  The mirror image growth rates illustrate the persistent problem of CD sales tanking too quickly to allow digital to pick up the slack.  Things will get a little better in 2012, with the total market contracting by just 4% and digital growing by 7% to hit $5.4 billion, and 41% of total revenues.

Now let’s take a look at what 2011 was like for three of digital music’s key players (Facebook, Spotify and Pandora) and what 2012 holds for them:

Facebook
2011.  Arguably the biggest winner in digital music in 2011, Facebook played a strategic masterstroke with the launch of its Digital Content Dashboard at the f8 conference.  Subtly brilliant, Facebook’s music strategy is underestimated at the observer’s peril.  Without investing a cent in music licenses, Facebook has put itself at the heart of access-based digital music experiences.   It even persuaded Spotify – the current darling of the music industry – to give it control of the login credentials of Spotify’s entire user base. Facebook’s Socially Integrated Web Strategy places Facebook at the heart of our digital lives.  And it’s not just Facebook that is benefiting: Spotify attributed much of its 500,00 new paying subs gained in October and November to the Facebook partnership.

2012. Facebook is quietly collecting unprecedentedly deep user data from the world’s leading streaming music services.  By mid-2012 Facebook should be in a position to take this to the record labels (along with artist profile page data) in the form of a series of product propositions.  Expect whatever is agreed upon to blend artist level content with music service content to create a 360 user experience.  But crucially one that does not require Facebook to pay a penny to the labels.

VERDICT: The sleeping giant of digital music finally stepped up to the plate in 2011 and will spend 2012 consolidating its new role as one of the (perhaps even *the*) most important conduit(s) in digital music history.

Spotify.
2011.
 It would be puerile not to give Spotify credit for a fantastic year.  Doubts about the economics of the service and long term viability remain, but nonetheless 2011 was a great year for the Swedish streaming service.  It finally got its long-fought-for US launch and also became Facebook’s VIP music service partner. Spotify started the year with 840,000 paying subscribers and hit 2.5 million in November.  It should finish the year with around 200,000 more.  Its total active user base is now at 10 million. But perhaps the most significant development was Spotify’s Developer platform announcement,paving the way for the creation of a music experience ecosystem.  Spotify took an invaluable step towards making Music the API.

2012: Expect Spotify’s growth trajectory to remain strong in 2012.  It should break the 3 million pay subscribers mark in February and should finish the year with close to 5 million.  And it will need those numbers because the funnel of free users will grow even more dramatically, spurred by the Facebook integration.  But again it will be the developer platform that will be of greatest and most disruptive significance.  By the end of 2012 Spotify will have a catalogue of music apps that will only be rivalled by Apple’s App Store.  But even Apple won’t be able to come close to the number of Apps with unlimited music at their core.  More and more start ups will find themselves opting to develop within Spotify rather than getting bogged down with record label license negotiations.  Some will find the platform a natural extension of their strategy (e.g. Share My Playlists) but others will feel competitive threat (e.g. Turntable FM).  If Spotify can harness its current buzz and momentum to create the irresistible force of critical mass within the developer community, it will create a virtuous circle of momentum with Apps driving user uptake and vice versa.  And with such a great catalogue of Apps, who would bet against Spotify opening an App Store in 2012?

VERDICT: Not yet the coming of age year, but 2011 was nonetheless a pivotal year paving the way for potentially making 2012 the year in which Spotify lays the foundations for long term sustainability.

Pandora
2011.
 Though 2011 wasn’t quite the coming of age year for Spotify it most certainly was for Pandora.  In June Pandora’s IPO saw 1st day trading trends reminiscent of the dot.com boom years.    By July it had added more than 20 million registered users since the start of the year to hit 100 million in total and an active user base of 36 million, representing 3.6% of entire US radio listening hours.  But Pandora also felt the downs of being a publically listed company, with flippant traders demonstrating their fear that Spotify’s US launch would hurt Pandora.

2012: And those investors do have something of a point:  whatever founder Tim Westergren may say, Spotify will hurt Pandora.  A portion of Pandora’s users used Pandora because it was the best available (legal) free music service.  Those users will jump ship to Spotify.  This will mean that Pandora’s total registered user number will not get too much bigger than 100 million in 2012 and the active number will likely decline by mid-year.  After that though, expect things to pick up for Pandora and active user numbers to grow again.  The long term outlook is very strong.  Pandora is the future of radio.  It, and services like it, will get an increasingly large share of radio listening hours with every month that passes in 2012, and with it a bigger share of radio ad revenues.  Pandora will be better off without the Spotify-converts, leaving it with its core user base of true radio fans. Spotify’s new radio play will obviously be a concern for Pandora  but this is Pandora’s core competency, and only a side show for Spotify.  Expect Pandora to up their game.

VERDICT: Since launching in November 2005 Pandora have fought a long, dogged battle to establish themselves as part of the music establishment, and 2011 was finally the year they achieved that.  There will be choppy waters in 2012 but Pandora will come out of it stronger than it went in.

Dear Lucian Grainge…

Dear Lucian Grainge and co,

Congratulations on your successful bid for EMI.  You are about to find yourself in charge of an unprecedentedly large share of the world’s music market.  Not so long ago, to have even imagined that regulators would countenance such a situation would have been fantasy.  But the world has changed, and I’m sure you’ll be glad that Prime Minister Monti will be too preoccupied with cleaning up Silvio Berlusconi’s mess to block another EMI acquisition (though time will soon tell whether Joaquín Almunia will be any more understanding, or indeed if he intends to carry on Neellie Kroes’s crusading).

For argument’s sake, let’s assume that the acquisition clears all regulatory hurdles and challenges.  You now control more than a third of the recorded music market.  And although some suggest that market share doesn’t matter anymore, I just don’t buy it.  In fact I think market share matters more than ever and I think you do to.  Of course, in pure business terms market share on its own means nothing.  Revenue pays the bills, not market share.  And yet, in the digital arena, market share takes on a whole new meaning. Because you and your label peers still exercise an effective monopoly of supply of content to digital services, whoever holds the largest market share holds the greatest degree of market control and can thus shape the market.

But you already know this because Universal was already the world’s largest label before the EMI acquisition and Universal exercised that dominant position to full effect.  I have to say, I think Universal has done so in a way which, on balance, has encouraged marketplace innovation.  Being the first to license to edgy services such as Spiral Frog, Comes With Music and – in principle at least – the stillborn Virgin Media unlimited MP3 service, saw Universal shoulder the risk of disruptive models.  You may have charged a premium in these situations for being the first major willing to take that risk, but you knew that your unique position as the world’s largest record label would – in most cases – led to the other majors coming on board.  (A fact that your licensee partners were banking on and were willing to pay that premium for.)

Now, as head of an even bigger ‘world’s biggest record label’ I’d love to watch you oversee a stepping-up of this approach.  And I’m not even too bothered about you charging a premium for being the first to license.  (Between you and I, that’s because I’m waiting for market dynamics to balance things out, for your bold licensing strategy to pull the rest of the marketplace with you, and to such an extent that all of the majors will be fighting to be the first to license to the next disruptive service.  So that nobody will be able to charge a premium for being first anymore.   I guess when it comes down to it, I’m hoping your exercising of seller-control will paradoxically create a buyers’ market.  But I can keep a secret if you can).

And while we’re talking, what I’d like to see less of, is using the justification of ‘risk mitigation’ as a means of stifling the market.  Yes, all majors demand big fat advances from digital services, and yes, it does a great job of separating the wheat from the chaff, of ensuring the market is driven by serious companies with serious scale.  But, as much as the prospect of the digital market evenly split between the Triple A of Apple, Amazon and Android may be more palatable to you than one in which Apple controls 75%+, you don’t really want that any more than I do. As pesky and unpredictable as those small disruptive start-ups can be, they are the ones which ultimately drive the quantum leaps in digital music progression.  If young start-ups have to commit the majority of their investment to label advances, that means that they will have so much less to spend on technology development and marketing.  Which of course means that you end up with safely secured digital income but no great new services driving the market forward.   Have you stopped to wonder why there has been a slowdown in licensed digital music services?  VCs are getting tired of financing non-starters.

Why am I firing this broadside at you when all of your major label peers are just as guilty?  Because now as head of the world’s biggest ever ‘world’s biggest record label’ I think it is only right that you start using your power to drive change across the entire market.  Your company has done so well in the digital arena by being bold, ambitious and, most importantly of all, by being innovative.  I’ve long held Universal up as the innovation standard for traditional media companies of all shapes and kinds.  But there comes a point at which that innovation must focus on providing the necessary conditions for driving innovation in the marketplace.

In short, I am asking you to continue to be a catalyst for innovation across the digital music marketplace, but also to resist succumbing to the conservatism and caution that your unprecedented market share will undoubtedly tempt you with.

Be bold, be brave, take risks (big risks) and most importantly of all, use your new power responsibly, don’t give the sceptics ammunition.  The digital music market needs Universal Music to continue to drive innovation not stagnation.

Good luck!

Kind regards

Mark Mulligan

OpenEMI, an Innovation Files Case Study

Following on from Part 1 of the ‘Innovation Files’ series, this post looks at EMI’s OpenEMI initiative and how it could drive transformational innovation within the major record label and publisher.

EMI today announced an interesting developer initiative that aims to revolutionize the way in which developers work with EMI.  Securing licenses from record labels is a notoriously resource intensive and time consuming process that can leave some apps still born: many smaller developers – especially the one man outfits – often simply can’t spare the resources, time (and money) that can be required.

EMI have inserted themselves into the developer value chain

To streamline the process EMI have inserted themselves directly into the developer value chain. They have partnered with the Echo Nest to build a ‘sandbox’ where developers can access a repository of continually updated EMI content including music, videos and artwork. Developers need only sign up to EMI’s API to start working with the assets.

Developers can either proactively develop their own ideas or respond to briefs and requests sent from EMI, who will funnel combined requests from artists, managers and labels.  Developers however do not get to simply build Apps using EMI’s content and then go take them to market.  Instead every app requires EMI approval, and EMI hopes to encourage best practice of developers submitting requests as early in the process as possible.

Clearly not all apps will get approved and there is certainly potential for log jams.  However the process will most likely streamline organically – assuming all partners have the right attitude and willingness to be sufficiently agile.   It will also be a great platform for all the extra content that 360 artist deals now deliver and that major labels too often just aren’t utilizing well enough.

Open EMI can, and should, go way beyond artist apps

Although initially this set up will principally act as an innovative alternative vehicle for sourcing artist apps – with developers playing around with EMI’s APIs replacing the traditional tender and quote process – it has much bigger longer term potential.  The name EMI has given this initiative speaks volumes: OpenEM.  It is a statement of intent.  Even though what we will see in this initial phase is relatively modest, it takes huge amount for an organization like EMI to take what is for them such a radical approach to their content.  More importantly I expect this to be an opening salvo in a broader strategic move.

An API for EMI’s own innovation

EMI have not just built an API framework for developers, they have built an API for their own future innovation.  The challenge for EMI is the degree to which they can fully harness this new innovation toolset and respond to the new approaches and mindsets it will require.

These are the three things I would like to see EMI use OpenEMI to deliver:

  • Learn from the OpenEMI developer community to help start building the next generation of music product, not just Artist Apps
  • Seed the culture and mindset of the OpenEMI community throughout EMI
  • Learn and implement innovation best practices throughout the entire EMI organization

OpenEMI is a brave step that has the necessary senior executive support to be a success. To help ensure success, OpenEMI’s champions will need to win support across all levels of the organization, and to do that they will need to demonstrate clear benefits to the most sceptical of opponents.

Driving Transformational Innovation

Transformational innovation is never easy to implement because its path is littered with the corpses of the products, processes and jobs associated with the old ways of doing things.  But it is exactly this difficult path that all media companies must take if they are to emerge intact out of this unprecedented period of disruption.  The Terra Firma debacle was an unfortunate distraction for EMI at exactly the time they didn’t need it, leaving them at distinct market disadvantage. They need an unfair advantage to start re-levelling the playing field.  Driving transformational innovation through the entire organization, commercial partner relationships, artist relationships and product strategy  is the fuel for that advantage. If harnessed to its full potential OpenEMI can be the first step on that tricky path.

iTunes Pass: First Take

So Apple finally gets into the music subscription business….well sort of. Today Apple announced the first of its iTunes Pass offerings, in partnership with EMI and 80’s electronic music pioneers Depeche Mode. In return for $18.99 a month buyers get

 

“…new and exclusive singles, remixes, video and other content from their favorite artists over a set period of time, delivered to their libraries as soon as they’re available. [They] will also receive the new album on its street date plus great music and video exclusives before and after the album’s release over the next fifteen weeks.”

 

Make no mistake, this is a big deal, but there are also holes in it.

 

The big deal part first:

  • Apple has held off getting into the subscription business for years, with Steve Jobs casting disparaging ‘music rentals’ jibes at Napster et al every time they raised their head above the parapet. Apple were never going to get into the temporary download business, but there was no ideological or business reason why ultimately they wouldn’t get into the subscriptions business, as long as it was on their terms and didn’t detract from the core value proposition of iTunes.
  • The ‘rental’ subscription business isn’t exactly in vibrant form. Rhapsody posted solid enough growth but that is against a back drop of persistent declines at Napster and Yahoo jumping out of the game. And even Rhapsody has failed to push music subscriptions out of a niche of tech savvy music aficionados. The iTunes Pass has mainstream appeal because a) it is targeted at specific fan groups b) it is cheaper c) it delivers permanent content
  • Q4 was another record sales quarter, but replacement sales were a big chunk. The growth in new iPod customers is slowing so Apple needs to look at ways of leveraging more ARPU out of its existing customers.
  • But the most significant part of all this is not what it means to Apple, but what it means to the music industry. This is a glimpse into the future. As we shift from the distribution paradigm to the consumption era the straight jacket of the album format and release schedule can be cast aside. We’d been saying for years at Jupiter (and now Forrester) that the record labels should start delivering a constant stream of content to fans, not just waiting for landmark release dates. In short, build an engaged, ongoing relationship with fans based on content not just artist pages on MySpace etc. This is a brave first step in that direction. Yes there have been similar efforts direct to fans via artist sites etc. but that misses the mass market opportunity and misses the point: this is the future of music retailing, not just some fan boy offer. Great work to EMI for driving this forward. Mark my words, much more will follow.

 

And now the gaps:

 

  • Subscribers get exclusive content but no exclusivity on the album. Even if the main release date was delayed by a week or two this would have given much more value to this offer. I can understand the reasoning, principally attempting to mitigate against lots of copies leaking onto file sharing networks ahead of release. But this logic is flawed as a) it only takes one copy to get up there and the recent U2 experience shows that there are always leaks, however tightly you police across the value chain b) most of those who would download from P2P networks are lost customers anyway. Those customers who pay nearly $20 in advance for content they’ve not even heard yet are the ones you should be worrying about. Everything should be focused around making them feel special, not some Quixote-esque tilting at Bittorrent.
  • My other minor quibble, no disrespect to Depeche Mode, but wasn’t there some bigger, more current act this could have been launched with?

 

Those caveats aside, this is a really exciting initiative. Welcome to the future of music retailing.

What the ISPs and the Record Labels Need to Do Next

The UK music industry and ISPs have been working towards the goals of the government-brokered Memorandum of Understanding since last summer but we’ve yet to see concrete results, in particular with regards to new music offerings. All stakeholders recognize the crucial importance of having a big fat carrot to accompany the stick. Yet we still seem to be some distance from the ISPs being empowered with truly compelling music services they can offer to their subscribers as a genuine alternative to file sharing.

On the surface of things this week’s reported tie up with Sky and Omnifone for a music subscription services seemed like a positive step forward. However, the lightest of scratches beneath the surface reveal it to actually be a microcosm of broader problems. Omnifone’s press announcement pointedly doesn’t even mention Sky as a partner for their new ISP white label offering. Although many press reports imply Sky have signed up, the only actual substance is that Sky are considering using Omnifone to power some of the technology on its offering.

The nuanced specifics here are important. Last year Sky and Universal Music proudly announced a music JV. Details were scarce in the extreme but the strategic ambition was bold. Sky has since then not been able to add any of the other 3 majors onto the JV roster. Part of this may well relate to the other majors getting increasingly narked about UMG’s highly proactive (even aggressive) digital strategy. But more broadly it talks to the fact that there is a lot of distance between what Sky wants to be able to offer its customers and what the labels feel they can provide for the financial terms Sky are willing to consider. This follows on the heels of Virgin Media dropping pursuit of PlayLouder’s MSP offering due to label concerns and also 7Digital so far failing to get any ISP to take up their white label offering.

The root of the problem is that the ISPs want to offer consumers more content and flexibility for less money (and pay the labels less) than the labels are willing to countenance.

But most UK ISPs have good reason for having high demands, as do many other continental European ISPs. They’ve been burnt once, launching poorly featured, weakly differentiated services near the turn of the century. Their inadequacies (and the subsequent failures) weren’t the fault of the ISPs per se, rather they were products of their time, restricted to the terms that the major record labels were willing to countenance back then. (e.g. 99 cents downloads that could only be played on your computer)

Apple changed the rules of the game and the failings of the ISP services were only accentuated.

The ISPs know now that if they get back in the game they have to be differentiated and be able to compete with Apple. But they also know that most of their file sharing subscribers are unlikely to be able or willing to pay much either. So the ISPs want compelling (ideally MP3) services that cost little or nothing to consumers. The labels business models can’t support that model without the ISPs picking up a lot of the cost, which they can’t afford to do due to falling broadband ARPU.

So we’re in a stalemate that nobody really expected to be in. (Indeed back in the summer of last year BMR CEO Feargal Sharkey said he expected to have something to announce “within a matter of weeks”). The labels thought the ISPs would lap up what they had to offer, and the ISPs thought they’d get more. The record labels are not about to change the fundamentals of how they value their IP, but there are some viable mid term compromises that can get us out of this malaise:

  • A series of Joint Ventures: MySpace have created a blue print for using this approach to get favourable licensing terms to deliver free music that wouldn’t have been financially viable otherwise. And the labels get lots of potential upside and to extend their role in the value chain. JVs would bind the ISPs and labels closer together, create common purpose and engender greater strategic flexibility.
  • Focus on free, not MP3: the success of Spotify has shown that MP3 isn’t everything. Free music streaming with good catalogue and easy to use UI is actually a winning formula. The business case for hiding the cost of a streaming service in the access subscription is a lot stronger than for MP3 downloads
  • Leverage all elements of the multiplay: ISPs typically have multiple products (TV, mobile etc.). Fully leverage these. Creating a compelling music offering means going beyond a balkanized online vs mobile vs TV strategy. Fully integrate and actually drive other business areas in the process e.g. extending a streaming music offering to mobile via an on-handset app will drive mobile data usage

Time is of the essence: every day that goes by, file sharing grows in popularity and becomes more entrenched. So agreeing on intermediate solutions with a view to a longer term roadmap is far favourable to stalling until the perfect solution can be agreed upon.

Mamma Mia: How Universal Are Using Music from the 70′s to Build a 21st Century Business

Universal Picture’s ‘Mamma Mia! The Movie’ has just become the most successful film musical of all time with 2.25 million first day US sales and previously 1.6 million first day UK sales (which in per capita terms means that British sales were three and half times more successful.)  UK 1st week sales peaked at 3.5 million, over a third higher than that blockbuster Titanic.  Mamma Mia has also been seen by over 32 million people world wide and there are eight different theatre productions currently globally.

Why am I spending so much time spouting stats from a Universal press release?  Because this is one of the success stories of how the music industry is building a diversified future.  Universal Music has leveraged the asset of one of it catalogue artists across stage, screen and TV.  This is a best practice example not just for multi-platform syndication but also for leveraging the multiple distribution assets of a corporate media powerhouse.   EMI is the only major not to have the benefit of movie and home video entertainment arms to lean on.  But even without that support, EMI can look to the hugely successful Queen inspired We Will Rock You musical.

Being a music company might be getting increasingly difficult but the success of ‘Mamma Mia!’ is evidence that the music industry is already coming up with new ways to be successful in the 21st century, even if it is with music from the 1970’s.

As a postscript, Universal’s press release includes links to various YouTube ‘sing along’ clips. How times have changed since Doug Morris arguing that YouTube should be sued.