Music industry revenues in review – what 2022 tells us about 2023

With a 2023 set to be a challenging year for the global economy, it is a good time to look at how the music industry has performed in the year to date. That is exactly what we have done in our forthcoming report: ‘Music industry earnings Q3 2022: Pre-recession growth’. We have tracked the performance of leading labels, publishers, DSPs, and live companies across the globe to create a holistic view of how the music business is performing across rights, distribution and live. Here are a few highlights that provide useful pointers as to how 2023 might shape up.

These are the key trends for revenue growth for Q1-Q3 2022 compared to Q1-Q3 2021:

• Record labels were up 14.3%, which is above the 11.8% that MIDiA forecasted at the start of the year, but with Q4 looking to be the quarter most heavily hit by the economic downturn, the full-year figure may well end up closer to 12% than 14%. Nonetheless, double-digit growth is commendable performance in such a tough economic environment, and bodes well for 2023.
  
• Publishers were up 21.1%, outperforming labels, reflecting factors such as the effect of historical digital royalty settlements, improved shares of streaming revenue (especially non-DSP), and the rebound of traditional performance income. Publishers have worked hard over recent years to ensure that they get a large share of income flowing to their songwriters, and 2022 reflects a job well done, though, of course, with further room for improvement.
  
• DSPs saw revenue growth of a more modest 6.2%, though this was pulled down by a dramatic slowdown in the Chinese market with Tencent Music Entertainment’s revenues flat. Spotify performed more strongly (7.7%), which was almost exactly in line with the major label’s streaming revenue growth of 7.3%. Subscriber growth across all companies was more than ten points stronger, thus indicating that consumer demand for streaming is strong going into 2023.
  
• Live continued its post-Covid rebound, with dramatic growth, benefiting from the still strong latent demand both from consumers and artists, eager to get touring again. However, with going out and going to concerts being the main things that consumers state they will cut back on during the recession, live may find the coming year more difficult than music rightsholders and DSPs.

Recessions have a habit of being self-fulfilling prophesies, with companies slowing down spend in anticipation of a coming slowdown, thus slowing down revenue growth for their suppliers, who then pass on the same cut backs to their suppliers and so forth. Despite all this, music rights and streaming may be well placed in the recession.

The lipstick effect

The case for music lies in lipstick, of all places. During previous recessions, lipstick sales boomed, representing an affordable luxury for consumers who could no longer afford the big-ticket items that they had been saving for or were used to buying. Music subscriptions may play an affordable luxury role, the soundtrack to evenings spent at home, when going out is a cost too far.

The early 2020s saw an influx of capital into the music business, with the promise of music rights being an asset class that was uncorrelated with the wider economy. The irony is that, as music catalogue investments slowed (due to rising costs of capital), the first nine months of 2022 saw the music business deliver a performance that suggests the industry is indeed setting a path that is not being pulled down by recessionary conditions as much as many other industries. There were areas of concern, of course, but the overall picture so far is a positive one.

The productisation of music rights

News that New York-based Pershing Square Tontine Holdings is planning to acquire 10% of UMG is the latest in a wave of financial transactions in the music rights space. Alongside this, Believe’s impending IPO has the potential to be one of the biggest things to happen to the independent music sector in some time, and comes as part of a wave of IPOs (e.g. WMG, UMG), SPACs (e.g. Anghami, Reservoir) and no end of catalogue funds and acquisition vehicles. This trend, with good cause, has been referred to as the ‘financialisation of music’ but that only captures part of what is at play here. This is more than simply an influx of capital and debt; financial institutions are now becoming part of the plumbing of the music business, and in turn they are changing the definition of what constitutes success. This shift in objectives and desired outcomes has the potential to rebalance how the music industry operates.

Though the strategies and aspirations of financial entities that are investing in music are diverse, they are usually very different to those held by music companies, particularly those of traditional music rights holders. What constitutes success for one may not matter much for the other. For example, a credible music industry objective (e.g., get playlisted) might have little immediate relevance to asset class value. Even the macro market trends illustrate the disconnect: the value of publicly announced music catalogue transactions grew by 14% in 2020, while global music publisher and label revenues each grew by just 8%, i.e., the financial value of music catalogues grew faster than their ability to generate revenue. 

Music rights have become established as an asset class, with their value defined differently than how the music industry typically measures value. The value of a song to the music industry resides in its commercial and cultural performance. A hit is a hit. But that same song’s value as part of a catalogue as a financial asset is also defined by a wider range of factors, including the relative value of music as an asset class compared to other financial asset classes. When entities such as pension funds and investment managers acquire music rights, they add them to diverse portfolios of assets, with music representing a particular tier of risk and return. Those financial institutions accrue value by repackaging the assets in derivative financial products that they then sell on. A pension plan is a straightforward example. This is the productisation of music rights.

This all matters because the strategic objectives of the financial entities will inevitably shape those of the music rights company. For example:

• The Tencent-led consortium that acquired 20% of UMG has made a bet on rights versus a bet on distribution (e.g. Spotify) and as such will have a set of views about what UMG’s relationship with streaming services should be. Right now, those views most likely align closely with those of UMG leadership, but if at some stage they were to diverge then UMG’s strategy itself could be affected. 
  
• The Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan’s investment in Anthem Entertainment forms part of an investment strategy that will expect an increase in asset value and return. Depending on the specifics of the strategy, this could, for example, favour Anthem focussing on catalogue acquisition over riskier creative investments in specific songwriters.

Neither of these examples are inherently positive or negative, they simply illustrate that the scale and nature of the investments coming into music rights are also changing how the music business operates. In some instances that will result in conservatism, in others bold opportunism. But the determining factors will be less about the music ethos of the music company and more about the investment thesis of the financial backer. 

External finance has long played an important role in the music business, but never before at this sort of scale. Music catalogue M&A transactions (not including IPOs, SPACs etc.) have already 74% of what was a record level in 2020. The scale of this inward investment shows no sign of slowing. So, whatever your views on the productisation of music rights, this is a market dynamic that is going to help shape the future of the music business.

Schubert Music Is the Latest Publisher to Push Into Recordings

Schubert Music Europe, the holding company of Schubert Music Publishing, today announced a deal with Sony’s independent label distribution division The Orchard. Under the deal, Schubert will distribute ten new record labels. This is just the latest example of an emerging trend that MIDiA identified back in November in a report entitled ‘Music Publishing | A Full-Stack Revolution’. The concept is a simple but important one: a growing number of music publishers are using the growing flow of capital going into music publishing catalogue mergers and acquisitions (M&A) to reverse into the recordings business. It is a trend with major implications for the future of the music business. 

The rise of the full-stack music company

Historically labels and music publishers have been largely distinct entities, even though the major music companies all have both within their corporate entities. There were some good historical reasons for the divisions, but these have become progressively less relevant in today’s global music market. A wave of both new and older companies are building a whole new take on what a music company should be, acquiring catalogues across both masters and publishing, as well as other assets such as library music (e.g. Anthem / Jingle Punks / 5 Alarm Music) and distributors (e.g. Downtown Music Holdings / AVL / Fuga). The future of music companies is one of diversification and the emergence of many different types of ‘full-stack’ music companies, meaning that categorisations such as ‘label’ and ‘publisher’ are becoming much less useful.

This is the model that Schubert Music, which already has some label assets, is pursuing. As  CEO Andreas Schubert explained, “we want to set new impulses and, in combination with our other services such as publishing, management and booking, be an attractive label alternative for artists from various genres”.

Getting a bigger share of revenue

Underpinning this market-level shift is a very simple but very important commercial imperative: publishers wanting a bigger share of streaming revenue. To heavily over-simplify, master recordings get around 50-55% of streaming revenue, compared to around 15% for the publishing side of the equation. This means that masters streaming revenue will grow much more than publisher streaming revenue in absolute terms. Assuming for illustrative purposes that rates do not change (though they will), a record label with the same number of rights and same market share as a music publisher will see its average streaming revenue per copyright increase by 3.5x more than a publisher in absolute revenue terms by 2026. Although the publisher’s revenue per copyright will grow at a faster rate, masters will gain more earning power. This is why publishers are building out their capabilities on the masters’ side of the equation (and I am saying ‘masters’ rather than ‘label’ as independent artists are very much part of this equation also).

Expect plenty more announcements like Schubert’s in 2020. This new decade is going to be more transformative for the structure of the music business than the last one was… and that one was pretty transformational!

How Music Publishers Are Driving a Full Stack Revolution

Music publishing catalogues are gaining momentum fast as an asset class for institutional investments, with transactions ranging from large catalogue mergers and acquisitions (M&A) through to investment vehicles for songwriters’ shares such as the Hipgnosis Fund and Royalty Exchange. Since 2010 the number of publicly announced music catalogue transactions – across recordings and publishing – totalled $6.5 billion, with a large volume of additional non-disclosed transactions. This growing influx of capital has implications far beyond publishing, however, as ambitious publishers are using the access to debt and investment to reverse into the recordings business.

Streaming the change catalyst

As with so many music market shifts, streaming is the catalyst for these changes. Streaming represented 27% of publisher revenues in 2018 and is set to near 50% by 2026. However, songwriter-related royalties – incorporating publisher and CMO payments – from streaming are less than a third of what labels get. Small-but-important increments such as the US disputed mechanical royalties rate increaseare a) difficult to push through, and b) will not get publishing royalties to parity with label royalties. This means that publishers will underperform compared to labels in the fastest-growing revenue stream. The alternative is a ‘if you can’t beat them, join them’ strategy.

BMG Music Rights and Kobalt set the precedent with label services divisions alongside their publishing businesses, enabling them to play on both sides of the streaming equation. Now a wide range of publishers, both traditional and next generation, are expanding their non-publishing businesses. – from ole/Anthem buying production music companies Jingle Punks and 5 Alarm Music, through Reservoir Music buying Chrysalis Recordsto Downtown buying CDBaby parent AVL. All have the common theme of publishers diversifying away from their core businesses to ensure they compete across a wider strand of the music business value chain.

In the traditional music business, it made sense for artists to sign their recordings to one company and their publishing to another. The next phase is the emergence of full-stack music companies that not only combine publishing and recordings but also include other assets to create agile businesses that are primed for the streaming era. Many of these are publishing companies expanding into the recordings business by leveraging the inflow of capital into publishing catalogues to fund diversification. The potential strategic benefits presented by the full-stack approach are well understood by incumbents.

Downtown, Round Hill, Kobalt, ole/Anthem, Primary Wave and Create Group are examples that reflect just how diverse this strategy is, with each business building very different strategic stacks. However, the unifying factor is the access to capital for music publishing companies gives them the ability to build war chests that most record labels could only dream of.

One of the most interesting permutations is the breadth of capabilities that some of these companies are building, as illustrated by the structural maps of Kobalt and Downtown. These are companies that are both built to thrive in the streaming era and to ensure that their creators can monetise across a diverse mix of otherwise fragmented income streams.

Music publishers of all kinds are expanding their reach across the music industry value chain, from artist distribution to library music and in doing so are starting a rebalancing of the music industry value chain. These are exciting times indeed.

This analysis is taken from MIDiA’s new report Music Publishing|AFull-Stack Revolution. Clients can click on the link to view the report and its dataset. The 3,000 word report contains details of 45 M&A transactions, annual M&A trends and analysis of the strategies of music publishers. 

If you are not yet a MIDiA client and would like to learn more about how to become one and how to access this report then email stephen@midiaresearch.com.

Music Sync: A Market Ripe for Change

Florence and the Machine’s performance of Jenny of Oldstones, which appeared over the closing credits of the April 21st HBO’s Game Of Thrones episode, has registered the most Shazams in 24 hours ever.The placing of a song has always had the ability to transform its fortunes, and that has never been more the case than now. The music sync market is booming, with the number of syncs higher than ever and more platforms and productions seeking new music. It is also a market with a host of structural challenges, which is the focus of MIDiA’s latest major new report on the music sync market – Music Sync Market Assessment: A Market Ripe for Change. Clients can access here and non-clients can purchase here from our report store.

We interviewed senior sync market executives of labels, publishers, sync agencies, sync tech, TV, games etc. for the report to help create the definitive take on this important but problematic sector. Here are some brief highlights of the report.

The music sync market has long been a source of high-margin income for rights holders as well as a means for helping break artists, with a well-placed, successful track having the ability to transform the career of an emerging artist. The growth of channels such as games, social video, and online video (like Netflix), and the corresponding renaissance in TV drama production, have combined to create an unprecedented volume of demand for the sync marketplace. A wave of tech start-ups has followed, each trying to fix parts of an otherwise very ad hoc and relationships-based industry.

Total sync revenues grew by 11% in 2017, but remain a minority component of music publisher revenue and have even less value for labels. Despite a boom in demand, much of the opportunity remains untapped. This is largely because the sync market is a complex, interconnected web of closely guarded personal relationships that operate on tradecraft, reputation and personal connections. It is a marketplace that technology has only brushed the edges of – but when it has, the results have been mixed. For example, streaming playlists have quickly become an established tool used by music supervisors, but on the other hand, many of the new start-ups addressing the space have failed to gain meaningful traction. In part this is because it is a sector that has modest appetite for change. Indeed, with personal reputations an industry currency, and lack of pricing transparency a well-used tool for securing price premiums, there is more internal incentive to remain in stasis than to embrace innovation.

A host of technology companies have come to market attempting to improve the music sync workflow, but many require pre-cleared rights. This is something that would undoubtedly accelerate the market but that rightsholders are typically unwilling to agree to because:

1. They need individual creator approval
2. They do not want to cede negotiating power

The music sync market has managed to remain strong by changing far less than most other parts of the music business. However, strategic shifts by newer, large-scale buyers such as Netflix, coupled with wider technology shifts, mean that the sync market will not be able to resist change for much longer.

Micro licensing (e.g. YouTube content) represents a major opportunity, especially if Facebook manages to execute on its thus-far underwhelming social music strategy. However, that requires a technology solution (e.g. Qwire, OCL) and simply cannot work on the same highly-manual and very slow mechanisms that mainstream sync operates with. Unless a tech solution is created, it will be royalty-free music providers like Epidemic Sound that will take most of the scale opportunity.

To read much more on the music sync market, check out the report here (Clients)   (Non-clients).

Companies and brands mentioned in the report:A+G Sync, Amazon, Beggars Group, Cue Songs, DISCO, Electronic Arts, Epidemic Sound, HBO, Jingle Punks, Jukedeck, Lickd, Musicbed, Music Gateway, MXX, Netflix, OCL, Proctor and Gamble, Qwire, Reverbnation, Songtradr, Sony/ATV, Soundvault, SyncFloor, Synchtank, Tunefind, Universal Music, Warner Chappell, YouTube