Global Recorded Music Revenues Grew By $1.1 Billion In 2016

Following on from the global market share numbers we released on Sunday, here are our findings regarding the growth of the overall market.

Throughout 2016 as the major label earnings were coming in there was a growing awareness that 2016 was going to be a landmark year for the recorded music business. It finally looked like streaming was going to push the industry into growth. Now with full year numbers in, the picture is even more positive than it first appeared. The recorded music market grew by 7% in 2016, adding $1.1 billion, reaching $16.1 billion, by far the largest growth the recorded music business has experienced since Napster and co pushed revenues into free fall.

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While it is too early to state that the corner has been turned, this is clearly a turning point of some form for the business. Underpinning the growth was streaming which grew by 57% in 2016 to reach $5.4 billion, up from $3.5 billion in 2015. Spotify has been key to this growth, accounting for 43% of the 106.3 million subscribers at the end of 2016. 2017 should see further strong streaming growth with another 40.3 million subscribers added, more than the 38.8 added in 2016. Apple Music and Deezer also both contributed strongly to growth and market share. Additionally, Amazon upped its game in 2016 and the introduction of the $3.99 Amazon Prime Music Unlimited Echo bundle could open up swathes of new, more mainstream users.mrm1703-fig0-5

Based strictly upon the recorded music revenue that is reported in financial accounts by the major record labels and / or their parent companies combined with trade association and collection society data, the 3 majors labels collectively generated $11 billion of gross revenue in 2016. Universal Music generated the most with $4.6 billion representing 28.9% of the market total. Sony followed with $3.6 billion (22.4%) and Warner with $2.8 billion (17.4%). These numbers do not include any corrections for any independent revenues that are recognised by major labels because they are distributed by majors or major owned distributors. Thus the ‘actual’ independent share will be higher but can only be accurately measured with a separate survey, so watch out for WIN’s forthcoming indie market share study that will do exactly this.

Volatile currency markets played a role in shaping the 2016 picture, with Sony’s revenues at the original Yen values increasing by just 0.9% but 13% in US dollar terms. In original currency terms, Warner Music was the standout success of 2016, with revenues increasing 11%.

To be utterly clear, these numbers represent the recorded music revenue that each of these companies report to their shareholders and to the financial markets. This is market share based purely on publically stated, financially regulated and audited filings. No more, no less. In this specific context record label recorded market share is simple arithmetic: the record label’s reported recorded music revenue divided by total global recorded music.

Conclusions

The recorded music industry changed gear in 2016 and the outlook is positive also with revenue looks set to be on an upward trajectory over the next few years. However, successive quarterly growth is not guaranteed. Streaming will have to work extra hard to offset the impact of continued legacy format declines as the 18% download revenue decline in 2016 illustrates. Thus, the midterm outlook is as much about legacy format transition as it is streaming growth. If streaming can outrun tumbling download and CD revenues as those walls come crashing down, then good times are indeed here.

Global Recorded Market Music Market Shares 2016

MIDiA and Music Business Worldwide have been tracking record label and publisher financial releases throughout 2016. In addition MIDIA has conducted market sizing work on the publishing sector and research for the Worldwide Independent Network’s (WIN) indie label market share project. Pulling all of these inputs together, along with reports from country trade bodies and PROs, MIDiA has created a recorded music market share model to provide a unique view of where the revenue flows in the global business. To ensure as representative a picture as possible all local currency data has been converted into US dollars at the currency conversion rates for the respective quarters. This removes the distortion effect that occurs when data historical data is retrospectively converted at today’s conversion rates.

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(MIDiA Research subscription clients can access the full 15 page excel spreadsheet with all of the underpinning data right now by clicking here.)

The Recorded Music Market In 2016

2016 was a big year for the global recorded music business, with record labels and publishers reporting growth almost across the board. Unsurprisingly, streaming was the driver of growth, increasing its share of label revenue from 23% in 2015 to 34% in 2016. However, the experience was far from uniform across the various corporate groups:

  • Universal: Universal is the world’s leading music group and that status remains firmly the case for 2016. Universal Music’s global record label revenue share was 28.9%, far ahead of the nearest rival Sony Music which had a 22.4% share. However, despite registering a 2.4% growth in USD terms (1.8% in euros), UMG’s share feel slightly from 30.2% in 2015. As with all labels, UMG had a big streaming year, seeing revenue increase by 56%, though this was just below the total market growth of 57%.  Universal Music Publishing’s market share was largely flat at 16.7% for 2016. Note: Although the Universal market share number reported here is smaller than numbers previously reported elsewhere it is grounded in widely accepted industry numbers. The IFPI reported global revenues of $14.95 billion for 2015 while Vivendi reported UMG recorded music revenues of €4.11 billion, which translated to $4.54 billion, which is a 30.2% market share for 2015. Also please note that a previous post had incorrectly reported a 32% decline in physical revenue for UMG in Q4 2016. 
  • Warner: Warner Music had the best major label performance in local currency terms, growing its revenue by 11% and its market share from 16.8% to 17.4%. On the streaming side Warner actually lost a little ground, seeing its market share fall from 19.3% in 2015 to 18.4% despite registering an impressive 51% annual growth in streaming revenue. What helped Warner’s total market share was the smallest local currency fall in physical revenue (just -1%) and the strongest local market currency growth in ‘other’ revenue, up 7%. Warner Chappell had a good year, growing revenue by 9% year-on-year and increasing its market share from 9.6% in 2015 to 10% in 2016.
  • Sony: Sony registered a US dollar growth of 13% in 2016, the highest of all the majors, increasing its market share from 21.3% in 2015 to 22.4% in 2016. However, Sony was helped markedly by the growing strength of the Yen against the dollar. In Yen terms SME’s revenue grew by just 0.9% in 2016. Streaming revenue was up 41.8% in Yen terms and 57% in dollar terms. SME’s streaming market share was flat year-on-year. Sony Music Publishing (including ATV) revenue fell by 1% resulting in market share falling from 24.3% in 2015 to 23% in 2016.
  • Independents: Independent labels saw revenue increase by 6% but that was not enough to prevent market share fall slightly from 31.6% in 2015 to 31.3% in 2016. However, these numbers reflect share according to distribution rather than ownership of copyright. Because so much independent label catalogue is distributed either directly via major labels or via distributors wholly owned by the majors, the actual market share is significantly higher. Watch out for WIN’s forthcoming 2017 indie market share report for a clearer picture of the indie sector’s contribution. On the publishing side independents had a strong year, seeing revenue grow by 6%, and market share grow from 49.4% in 2015 to 50.1% in 2016. Note that the independent numbers include revenue from leading labels in Japan (the world’s 2nd biggest music market globally) and South Korea (another top 10 market) where the western major labels are minor players.

(MIDiA Research subscription clients can access the full 15 page excel spreadsheet with all of the underpinning data right now by clicking here.)

Quick Take: Sony Music UK Buys Ministry Of Sound Recordings

Leading UK indie Ministry of Sound Recordings today announced its sale to Sony Music UK. While this is undoubtedly another case of a big major swallowing up a smaller indie, there is a much more important angle to this – surviving in the streaming era. Ministry of Sound is unusual in that it is a label with a relatively small catalogue, instead its business is built around compilations. In doing so it has built an incredibly robust and profitable business. No mean feat in the current climate. But Ministry’s core strength has also become an Achilles Heel with the onset of streaming.

Ministry licenses music from other labels to build its compilations. This approach works well in a sales model where proceeds are split between the respective parties. But in the context of streaming, any money generated by plays of tracks on a compilation go to the label that owns the track not to the label that curated the compilation. This is why Ministry compilations have been conspicuously absent from streaming services and it is also why Ministry ended up in conflict with Spotify when the streaming service initially refused to take down user playlists that replicated Ministry compilations and that used Ministry artwork.

At the time, the Spotify case raised the still-to-be-answered question of just how much curation is actually worth. Spotify and Ministry settled their differences but the underlying economics remain, and meanwhile Spotify also upped its curation game. Ministry thus faced the double whammy of increased curatorial competition and an inability to make streaming pay. Enter stage left, Sony Music.

With its co-owned Now brand, Sony is as good a fit as Ministry could find in a major. Sony for their part are getting one the most valuable compilation brands and immediate dance music culture credibility. Sony also has big digital plans for Now, which Ministry will no doubt slot into nicely. On top of this, because Sony own so much catalogue themselves, they can make the economics of compilations work in the streaming environment.

The fact that 25% of music subscribers still buy compilation albums show that however a good job streaming playlists might be doing, there remains a big demand for compilations, even within the core of streaming music aficionados. Curated playlists will continue to gain importance but compilations are going to live alongside them for a good long time to come. And all the while the distinction between what constitutes a playlist and a compilation will continue to blur.

Apple Music And The Listener-to-Buyer Ratio

The next 6 to 12 months could prove to be some of the most disruptive record labels have ever experienced, and nowhere will this pain be felt more than among smaller independent record labels with strong digital sales.   At the heart of this disruption will be Apple Music and the wider continued ramping up of streaming. If Apple Music is a success over the coming year it will do one or both of the following:

  1. It will convert / cannibalize non-subscribing download buyers
  2. It will convert / cannibalize existing subscribers

The probability is that it will do a bit of both with an emphasis on #1. The market level net impact of #1 will depend on the degree to which Apple converts lower spending iTunes buyers versus higher spending ones i.e. whether it increases or lowers the average spend.   But even if it is the latter the effect for smaller labels could still be net negative over the coming year. If you are a big label with hundreds of thousands or millions of tracks then you have enough catalogue to quickly feel major revenue uplift from 5 or 10 million new subscribers. If you only have a few hundred or a few thousand tracks though then the picture is less rosy.

The Listener-to-Buyer Ratio

At the core is the listener-to-buyer ratio i.e. how many new listeners you get for each ‘lost’ buyer. Let’s say that for every download sale lost due to an iTunes customer becoming an Apple Music subscriber transforms into 10 listens by 3 people within 12 months. So 30 streams instead of one download. The listener-to-buyer ratio here is 3:1. A generous assumption perhaps but let’s work with it. Against a base of $25,000 of download revenue that would translate into $6,250 less download revenue and $2,365 more streaming revenue. So a net loss of $3,885, a 16% decline.

If we reduce the average plays to 5 per user the revenue decline becomes 20%. In order for the revenue impact to be neutral the total new streams would have to be 80, which with a listener-to-buyer ratio of 3:1 would require each person to stream the track 27 times. Or alternatively a 8:1 listener-to-buyer ratio with 10 plays per user would also deliver no change in revenue. A great track could feasibly have an average of 27 plays per user per year, a good track could have 10. But an average track is going to be below both. So realistically, more than an 8:1 ratio is going to be required.

Scale Looks Different Depending On Where You Are Sat

What quickly becomes apparent is that the most viable route to ensuring Apple Music streaming revenue offsets the impact of lost iTunes sales revenue is as big an installed base of streaming users as possible. The more Apple Music users there are, the more likely more of them will find and listen to your music. This is why the scale argument so is so important for streaming and also why small labels feel the effect less quickly. If you have a vast catalogue you don’t need to worry too much about the listener-to-buyer ratio because you have so many tracks that you are a much bigger target to hit. The laws of probability mean that most users are going to listen to some of your catalogue.

Let’s say you are a big major with 1 million tracks out of the 5 million tracks that get played to any meaningful degree in streaming services. That gives you a 20% market share. But if you are an independent with 50,000 tracks that gives you 1%, 20 times less than the major. Which means that you are 20 times less likely to have your music listened to. And that is without even considering the biases that work in favour of the majors such as dominating charts and playlists, and other key discovery points. So in effect the major record label in this example could be 30 to 40 times more likely to have its music listened to. Which is why the listener-to-buyer ratio is unlikely to keep the major label’s exec up at night but could be the difference between sinking or swimming for the independent.

In all probability Apple Music will make streaming revenue a truly meaningful income stream for all record labels but in the near to mid term big record labels are likely to see a very different picture than the smaller independents.

Apple, The Indies And The Rise Of The Digital Monopsony

Much of the independent label community have come out in public opposition to Apple’s request for a 3 month free trial that crucially would not involve any royalty payments to labels. Besides the fact this has revealed inconsistency in major label licensing strategy (some services have to pay royalties for their free trials) it also raises questions about Apple’s growing role as a content platform. In the old model (i.e. selling CDs on the high street and mall) retailers held all the power, charging labels for prime placement, priority shelf space and carving out additional commercial benefits such as breakage (whereby they were given a discount on a set assumption of a % of shipments that would break in transit, even if they didn’t). In the old new model (i.e. where we are now) the power shifted to the labels with music stores and services having to pay advances, minimum guarantees etc. in order to sell the labels’ content. Even breakage got reinvented and turned into a commercial benefit for labels (they get paid for under usage of services). Now a new model is emerging where a few big platforms are beginning to exercise the power they have been quietly building for the last half a decade or so.

Apple, Amazon And Google – The Digital Superpowers

Apple, Amazon and Google are all digital content platforms. They each own the customer, control billing, know everything about him/her, control some or all of the hardware and have a diverse portfolio of content assets. Each has also become super important to media company partners. For music labels Apple has become the dominant source of digital retail revenue, Amazon the dominant source of physical retail revenue and Google the dominant digital discovery platform. Each holds the whip hand in their respective area of dominance. Now they all want more. They may each want slightly different things but none are shy of wielding their respective spheres of influence to get to what they want. This is where the indies’ dispute with Apple comes into play. Apple is in the business of music in order to sell hardware and has known for a number of years that streaming is going to be how it transitions that role in a post-download world. It has thus far taken a very responsible approach to its sales role and has been sensitive to the risk of decimating label revenue if it does not time its streaming transition properly. But the first step on that journey has now been taken and the point of no return is fast approaching. Which is why it is crucial that all rights holders have the right agreements in place and which is why the indies are making the noise they are.

The Power Of The Platform

In an echo of Google’s heavy-handed YouTube Music Key negotiations with indies and DIY artists, one independent artist has claimed that Apple has threatened to remove his music from the iTunes Store if he does not allow his music to be used in the free trial. Whether this is true or not (and it may well not be) is almost not the point. What it highlights is Apple’s power as a platform. Artists and labels alike simply cannot do without iTunes revenue. Whether Apple needs to overtly play the card or not, the implication of the veiled threat is clear. And Apple is not exactly alone. Last year Amazon clashed with book publisher Hachette over eBook pricing and during the dispute employed a number of pressure tactics including: refusing to take pre-orders on Hachette titles, placing a 6 week delay on delivery of them and even pointing users to competitor titles when they searched for an Hachette book. All of these were clear misuse, possibly even abuse, of Amazon’s role as distribution platform but no regulatory body even raised an eyelid. Apple will have watched the development with acute interest.

The Rise Of The Digital Monopsony

Apple, Amazon and Google are all unique cases. They have become de facto monopolies for their respective sectors, exercising control over the entire platform of user, supplier and interaction between them. There isn’t really an economic term that properly explains them but monopsony is the closest: a company that is the only effective buyer and seller of a product and can thus dictate terms at both ends of the equation. These digital monopsonies are growing pains of the digital economy. After all, we are still in the very early stages of the digital economy. If this were the industrial revolution Robert Stephenson wouldn’t have developed the steam locomotive yet. Consider this phase market adolescence. This raises challenges for regulation with regulatory bodies largely unable to deal with companies that exercise effective monopoly power but that do not meet the criteria of a pre-digital era economy monopoly. Of course the indie labels cannot afford to wait for that dynamic to change so in the meantime they must seize the initiative in this issue and others like it.

An Opportunity To Change The Narrative

Right now though the indies have an opportunity to use this case to genuinely move the needle. Apple has pushed them out of their comfort zone. Instead of just digging in their heels they can decided to push Apple out of its comfort zone and request something similarly game changing of Apple in return. In short, turn a defensive move into an offensive one and help set the agenda rather than being stuck in the familiar rut of responding to the one set by the major labels and Apple. Apple Music may have underwhelmed at launch but the company still has the most important music monetization platform on the planet. Most indie labels and majors alike would all but collapse if iTunes revenue disappeared overnight.

Right now Apple still wants to play the role of good partner, albeit one that negotiates hard. So the labels still have a chance to help shape what the next chapter in Apple’s music story can look like. That may not always be the case, especially if Artist Connect has developed into a label like service layer 3 years from now, which I suspect will be the case. Apple is no Google, it still wants first and foremost to sell music rather than give it away. That may not always hold true.   Similarly the power of the digital monopsonies will likely strengthen over the coming half decade or so. So right now the indies are probably in the strongest position they will be in for some time, even if it might not feel like it to them. They need to seize this moment.