Music subscriber market shares 2023: New momentum

With UMG leading the charge to reshape the music industry into a more label-friendly form, 2023 may, with hindsight, go down as the year before everything changed. Whatever lies ahead though, new models will take time to deliver benefits. Music subscriptions are therefore going to remain the bedrock of music rightsholder revenues for the foreseeable future. So, it is a good thing that music subscriptions had such a good year in 2023.

As of Q3 2023, there were 713.4 million music subscribers globally, which was 90 million up on the 623.4 million one year earlier in Q3 2022. This matters for two reasons:

1. We are already nearly three quarters of the way to having one billion music subscribers globally. That is no small achievement. For context, as recently as five years ago, we had only just passed the quarter of a billion subscriber mark
   
2. The 90 million subscribers added in the 12 months to Q3 2023 was more, yes more(!), than the 83.5 million added one year earlier. In fact, the number added was nearly as many as those added in 2020. Not bad for a maturing category with key markets hitting near-saturation

However, there is a bit of a problem with looking at the global market: it is increasingly no longer a global market, but instead, one of two halves: the West and the Global South, with each region throwing off dramatically different metrics and growth narratives.

Nowhere is this better illustrated than in the market share rankings:

• Spotify dominated the global music subscriber base in Q3 2023 with 31.7% market share. More than that, it actually increased its share from 0.4 points from Q3 2022. So, for all the flak Spotify has thrown at it, it outgrew the market in 2023. Newer, emerging market territories were central to this growth, but it was Spotify’s traditional heartland (North America and Europe) that drove the majority (59%) of its subscriber growth. Compare and contrast this with the all-DSP picture, where North America and Europe drove just 29% of subscriber growth, with Asia Pacific accounting for nearly two thirds of all non-Western subscriber growth
  
• China, a market in which only Apple of the Western DSP operates, underpins this non-Western growth, and the clearest manifestation of this is Tencent Music Entertainment (TME). With 102.7 million subscribers in Q3 2023, TME represents 14.4% of all global subscribers, despite this being an effectively China-only number. NetEase Cloud Music (6.1% share and China-only) and Yandex (3.4% share and Russia-only), further represent the dynamic growth from regions where Western DSPs largely do not operate. This is the new, bifurcated nature of the global music subscriber market
  
• Apple Music (12.6%), Amazon Music (11.1%) and YouTube Music (9.7%) represent the remainder of the leading Western DSP pack. Along with Spotify, these three DSPs represent 65% of the global market, but only 59% of 2023 growth. Western DSPs are still the core of the market, but they are collectively losing share. But, even within these four, there is a diverging picture, with YouTube Music and Spotify gaining share in 2023 while Amazon and Apple lost share. Between Q3 2022 and Q3 2023, Spotify added more subscribers than all three other leading Western DSPs combined

2023 was a strong year for music subscriptions, delivering more growth than perhaps had been expected in such challenging macro-economic and geo-political circumstances. Even North America and Europe grew slightly faster in 2023 than in 2022. But, as commendable as squeezing more growth out of otherwise mature markets is, the inescapable paradigm shift is the emergence of the Global South as the growth driver of tomorrow’s music subscriber base.

Want even more detail? Check out the full music subscriber market shares report and data set, with data for more than 20 DSPs across more than 40 territories, with data for every quarter from Q4 2015 to Q3 2023.

For more info email stephen@midiaresearch.com

Spotify re-positions two-tier licensing (we are getting closer, and it can be even better)

Spotify released a blog post laying out how it wants the world to understand its new two-tier royalty system. The positioning is clear, leading with the statement that it will drive “an additional $1 billion toward[s] emerging and professional artists” and the PR push included several supporting quotes from the independent sector (with no major label quote to be seen). Positioning-wise, this is certainly now a case of ‘where it started’ (reverse Robin Hood) and ‘how it is going (everyone is a winner). Of course, the truth lies somewhere in between, but we are getting to a better place and there are some really important positive points made by Spotify. 

The main benefits outlined by Spotify are:

• Reducing fraud (financial penalties for actors that manipulate streams)
• Cutting back on ‘noise’ (increasing the minimum stream length to two minutes)

The cumulative impact of these measures will be more money going into the royalty pot for ‘honest hard-working artists’. This is all positive and represents part of a much needed recalibration of the wider model to tackle the long-term rise of unintended consequences of the streaming economy.

However, because the two-tier royalty system is also deployed alongside these measures, it will still be bigger artists that benefit from the larger royalty pool. Spotify states that redistributing the revenues from the end of the tail will be more impactful for ‘these tens of millions of dollars per year to increase payments to those most dependent on streaming revenue — rather than being spread out in tiny payments that typically don’t even reach an artist’. Spotify also makes the important point that most of the royalties from <1,000 stream tracks do not even make it to the artists because they do not meet the minimum payout levels set by labels and distributors.

Of course, this means that labels and distributors who have a substantial numbers of songs with <1,000 streams will see portions of their income withheld. For smaller labels this could be impactful. All labels shoulder risk knowing that a majority of their artists are unlikely to deliver them a profit. Bigger labels, major labels especially, hedge this bet by only paying artists royalties once they have generated more income than the advances the labels pay them. Smaller labels can rarely afford to pay advances and they also typically pay a higher share of royalties (e.g., 50%) to artists. So, having a payout threshold of, say, $50 per track, is their means of hedging risk. Some of that hedged risk will go out of the window for smaller labels. 

And to be clear, I am referring here to genuine smaller labels, not to synical ones that who trade in 30 second noise clips to gain the system. Those labels will suffer in this system, and rightly so.

A larger label might argue that smaller labels should simply focus on signing tracks with more potential, but the label marketplace is a competitive one. The ‘bigger artists want to go to bigger labels’ dynamic applies to the bottom of the tail too – it just translates to ‘not-so-small artists want to go to not-so-small labels’. Unless a label is investor backed, they all need to start small. There is a risk that these smaller labels do not have a voice in this debate.

But, let’s revisit this objective: ‘increase payments to those most dependent on streaming revenue — rather than being spread out in tiny payments’. 

(It is also important to note that the 1,000 streams threshold is for songs, not artists. So, many artists (and labels) will receive royalties for some, but not all of their songs. So this is not just about artists with <1,000 streams.)

While this is true at the input stage, it does not necessarily translate on the output stage. Assuming that the <1,000 streams revenue was worth around $60 million in 2023 (Spotify says “tens of millions”). Then, taking Spotify’s own Loud and Clear figures, applying the $0.03 per stream royalty, and distributing that on a share-of-streams basis for all other artists, provides an income translating to an extra +/- 1% of annual Spotify royalty income for those artists. So, the system takes money that is insignificant to the bottom of the tail and then divides it up into amounts that are insignificant, in relative terms, to the rest.

To be clear, some artists will get a good payout, peaking at somewhere around $20,000 for the top artists. However, as they already earn over a couple of a million each, that amount is probably not meaningful to them in relative terms.

So, where am I driving at with all this? How about we take the proposed system and instead of dividing into micro payments for everyone, just target it at one small group of emerging artists with potential. Turn it into an artist development fund rather than an inverted redistribution of wealth. That way the money can be put to really good use, investing in the very part of the market where the money came from in the first place. 

In summary, Spotify’s new positioning of two-tier licensing is fair, reasonable and positive in most respects. The associated (but separate) noise and fraud measures are super important and will help bring greater fairness and equity to the system. But distribution of the <1,000 stream royalties remains a sticking point. As it will have such a small impact on the income of other artists, surely funnelling these “tens of millions” into an artist development fund is a win-win that the industry can get behind?

Why artist subscriptions are the perfect partner to two-tier licensing

With two-tier licensing now a thing, it is time to focus the discussion on how to add new components to the DSP ecosystem that will help long-tail artists continue to thrive in this brave new world. There are many positives that two-tier licensing will bring (helping mid-tier artist remuneration, attaching an appropriate premium to lean-forward listening, etc.) even if the streaming fraud efforts will likely soon be offset by bot farms increasing their minimum streams thresholds. But the potential downturn to long-tail artist income is a very real prospect. Not only could artist subscriptions re-level the playing field, but self-releasing artists (artists direct) also have an opportunity here that label artists do not.

For more years than we care to remember we have made the case for artist subscriptions, most recently in this MIDiA report. The data in the report shows that what fans want to pay for most (and by some margin) is early access to music, exclusive merchandise, and songs. On one hand, this makes artists subscriptions relatively low effort, as there is no need to produce backstage access videos or host live Q&As, among other things. On the other hand, it is problematic for record labels that have to consider factors such as release campaigns driving large stream volumes to trigger the algorithms, and commercial agreements with DSPs that can complicate exclusives. Artists direct, however, have no such constraints. 

MIDiA’s data shows strong willingness among fans to pay, up to $5 an artist. But, if a long-tail artist was to price their subscription at just fifty cents, it would only take five fans to subscribe to generate the same amount of income a thousand streams would. Get that to ten fans (surely eminently achievable for many long-tail artists) and they would be earning double the minimum stream threshold of the two-tier system. It is a mechanism that enables DSP streaming to deliver on the elusive long tail promise and, to boot, everyone wins:

• Artists direct get income that is more meaningful income than in today’s one-tier system
• Bigger artists continue to get a more meaningful share of streaming royalties

The beauty of this approach is that the infrastructure is already in place, it just needs a little tweak. In August, Spotify and Patreon announced a new initiative for podcasters, enabling them to create premium subscriptions for exclusive podcast content. Artist subscriptions thus already exist on Spotify, they are just not called artists subscriptions, yet.

Starting in 2024, Spotify and other DSPs face a delicate balancing act. They must navigate the demands of larger rightsholders – a term that covers not only major labels but also a very large number of indie labels and publishers of all shapes and sizes. At the same time, they are going to have to convince the wider creator community that they are there for them. 

This is particularly pertinent because DSP streaming no longer hold a monopoly over music creators. In 2022, the number of creators releasing outside of the traditional digital supply chain grew twice as fast as those releasing into streaming. This is the second successive year that this has been the case. A forking is taking place. These creators are choosing share their music on platforms like TikTok, YouTube, Soundcloud, BandLab, Discord, Twitch, Instagram, etc. rather than risk getting lost in the DSP ocean. From a creator economy perspective this is no bad thing, in fact, it will probably be a good thing. However, from a DSP perspective, they will want to utilise every resource at their disposal to position themselves as the most attractive platform for artists.

Two-tier licensing is about to become a reality

With the dust still far from settled on the UMG / Deezer streaming royalty proposal, something even bigger is coming: Spotify is turning the concept into reality in Q1 2024. The behind-the-scenes conversations have been ongoing for some time, but the details were stated publicly on panels at last week’s ADE conference, meaning that the information is now firmly in the public domain. Obviously, nothing is official at this stage, so consider this ‘as reported’ information. Even if the final details end up varying, what is clear is that two-tier licensing is about to become a reality.

Things are moving fast, going from ‘limited trial’ to ‘actually happening’ in the proverbial blink of the eye. If Spotify is indeed set to launch two-tier royalties just months from now, it begs the question as to what the Deezer trial was about in the first place? If decisions had already been made elsewhere, then the likelihood is that it was a way of softening up industry opinion before the big news hit next year, to acclimatise the industry community to the concept ahead of launch.

Streaming democratised access to the means of distribution, enabling an unprecedented growth in artists and releases. But the brake is now being firmly applied. Streams may have all been created equal, but now some streams are becoming more equal than others. 

There are, of course, compelling arguments for ‘fixing’ streaming royalties (arguments that we have discussed at length). But if consumers are choosing to listen to long-tail artists, or if the algorithms consider long-tail artists to be the right fit for their tastes, then the ‘problem’ lies with consumption patterns, not royalties. (And of course, what consumers are listening to is also the most precise way measure where and how subscribers allocate the value pf their subscription.)

Between 2019 and 2022, artists direct streaming revenue grew by 130% while the majors grew by 58%. Long-tail artists are growing their share of ear (even accounting for the fact that algorithms are not neutral agents). In 2022, artists direct accounted for 8% of global streaming revenue and at current trajectory would reach 10% by 2025. Consider that WMG’s share was 16% in 2022, and it becomes clear just how significant the long-tail pool is.

But here is where the cynical genius of the two-tier system comes into play. Right now, streams and revenue are effectively synonymous, but by this time next year, they will mean very different things. The majority of artists direct artists will no longer be paid for their contribution to the value of the $11.99 subscription. The c.10% of consumption they will generate will disappear from the streaming revenue map. They will be othered, their revenue becoming a new black box for the biggest artists to share between themselves. Which means that, hey presto, all that annoying artists direct market share suddenly gets reallocated to everyone else. Market share erosion? What market share erosion?

The two-tier system does not even try to turn back the clock on the rise of independence, it simply funnels the growing revenue from this cultural paradigm shift to the bigger artists who are losing share. If DSP streaming was the only game in town, then the risks of antagonising long-tail artists (label and direct) would be relatively low. But the music consumption and creation landscapes are changing. Non-DSP streaming revenue is outgrowing DSP streaming, while creators choosing to release only on non-DSP platforms is growing twice as fast as artists releasing onto DSPs.

Perhaps it would serve bigger labels and artists well, to have smaller artists and labels focus their attention elsewhere. But if they do so, then they will take audience attention and cultural capital with them. At some stage or another, that kind of shift will start to bite into DSP acquisition and retention rates. By which stage it may be too late to halt the decline. 

Spotify’s audiobooks move is another brick in the audio wall

Streaming has come a long way since its days as a pure music service for super fans. Spotify’s announcement that it is making 15 monthly audiobook hours available to premium subscribers is simply the latest step in a journey that has seen streaming become the 21^st century’s take on radio. This has been achieved with the steady addition of non-music content (podcasts and audiobooks especially) and a growing emphasis on programmatic lean back consumption. As with all change, when it sits in an extended period of transformation, its immediate impact is often under-recognised. Audiobooks are the completely natural and logical progression for Spotify (and other DSPs), but they are also another waymarker in the journey away from being a pure play music service.

The pandemic was a catalyst for audiobook consumption. Audiobooks had been around for a long time already, with Audible leading the charge, but it was the sudden increase in non-allocated time that people found themselves with that triggered a coming of age for the format. Listening surged, including of podcasts, but as normal life slowly returned, audiobook consumption dipped again, though to a higher point than pre-pandemic levels. 

In many respects, Audible never really managed to push the format out of its niche foundations, with weekly active user (WAU) penetration still stuck at around 10% (Q1 23). DSPs though, represent the opportunity to mainstream the proposition – something that Deezer identified many years ago by becoming the first DSP to integrate audiobooks. Deezer was, however, probably a little too early, launching audiobooks when streaming was still almost entirely about music and still very lean-forward. Now, streaming is the soundtrack to our everyday lives. It is about filling the silence (or blocking out the noise) more than active listening. In this use case, spoken word audio is just as good a fit as music. In fact, it can often be a better fit. For example, getting lost in the narrative of an audiobook can make a daily commute fly by a lot quicker than simply listening to a playlist, in large part because it commands your attention.

Spot the important shift there? Audiobooks can turn passive listening into active listening in a way that music cannot so easily do. Music carved out hours for streaming by being passive, and now audiobooks and podcasts can colonise those hours with active consumption. The more active usage becomes, the more engaged a user is and the less likely they are to churn. Music did the hard yards; audio reaps the rewards.

Music rightsholders have long been concerned about audio eating into listening hours, less because of the cannibalisation of hours and more so because of the risk of DSPs using that as a basis for negotiating down the share of the subscription fee that gets paid to them. 15 hours of audiobooks may not sound like a lot but it represents close to 40% of the monthly music listening hours of the average subscriber. There is a good chance that there will be strong uptake, not least because over half of audiobook WAUs are also Spotify WAUs (which will probably give Audible pause for thought).

Of course, from Spotify’s perspective at least, the benefit of reducing music rightsholder fees simply to replace them with book publisher fees would be self-defeating. That is unless Spotify can secure the latter for less. But there is another crucial variable at play: original content. Back in 2020, when Spotify was hiring its head of audiobooks, the job description included the following: “Develop, pitch and oversee production of high-quality content”.  Just as with podcasts, audiobooks represent an opportunity for Spotify to develop original content and improve its margins.

Music subscriber market shares 2022

MIDiA has just released its annual ‘Music subscriber market shares’ report and dataset, with data for 23 DSPs across 33 different markets (clients can access it here). Here are some of the key global trends:

Music subscriptions may be recession-resilient, as China leads the way

As the world edges towards a recession, the music streaming market continues to stand strong. Despite indications of slowdown in some markets, the global music subscriber market remains buoyant. Growth, though, is uneven, with a number of leading streaming services outpacing the rest, especially the Chinese ones, which are now setting the global pace. 

Home entertainment tends to perform well during recessions, not least because people are inclined to cut down on leisure spend (eating out, bars, clubs, etc.), and thus spend more time at home. In previous recessions, lipstick sales boomed, reflecting their role as an affordable luxury that consumers turn to when they can no longer afford the more expensive luxuries. Music subscriptions have a good chance of playing a similar role in the coming recession.

The early signs are positive (subscriber growth was stronger in the full year of 2021 than 2020), and though the first half (H1) of 2022 growth was down from H1 2021, this reflects the mature state of the streaming market in many markets, as much as it does global economic headwinds.

The evolution of the global music subscriber market is beginning to fork between the leading Western digital service providers (DSPs) and those in Asia – China especially so. Nearly all the leading DSPs continue to experience strong subscriber growth, but none more so than Chinese DSPs Tencent Music Entertainment (TME) and NetEase Cloud Music. 

These were the key trends in 2021 and the first half of 2022:

• Subscribers: There were 616.2 million subscribers by the mid-point of 2022, up by 7.1% from the end of 2021. Total net subscriber additions for the first six months of 2022 (42.1 million) were down on the 53.8 million that were added one year earlier, hinting at the slowing global economy. However, more subscribers were added in 2021 than 2020
  
• Revenue: The $12.9 billion of subscription label trade revenue generated in 2021 was up by 23.1% on 2020, and it was the first year since 2017 that revenue growth exceeded subscriber growth, resulting in a 1.0% increase in global annual ARPU, reaching $22.42
  
• Spotify: With 187.8 million subscribers in Q2 2022, Spotify remained by far the largest DSP. However, its market share has steadily eroded since Q4 2020, and its Q2 2022 share of 30.5% was down from a high of 33.2% in Q2 2018
  
• Tencent Music Entertainment and NetEase Cloud Music: Spotify’s declining market share has much to do with the growth of the Chinese market (where Spotify does not operate). In Q4 2021, TME overtook Amazon Music to become the third largest DSP globally, and in Q2 2022 it had 82.7 million subscribers (13.4% market share). China has long been the world’s second largest subscriber market and is on track to soon surpass the US as the world’s largest
  
• Apple, Amazon, and YouTube: Amazon Music was the fourth largest DSP, with 82.2 million subscribers, and YouTube Music was fifth, with 55.1 million. Both gained share between Q2 2021 and Q2 2022, growing faster than the total market. While YouTube and Amazon both gained share in 2022, albeit it at a declining rate, second-placed Apple Music continued its long-term trend of underperforming the market, with its 84.7 million subscribers recording a 13.8% market share, down 1.2% from Q2 2021. 

The global music subscriber market is approaching a pivot point, with the slowdown in mature, Western markets contrasting with more dynamic growth in other regions. It is realistic to assume that the global recession and the organic maturation of the global subscriber market will result in some slowdown of growth in 2023, even if the sector remains otherwise resilient.

The slowing growth should be the catalyst for what needs to come next, especially in developed markets: unlocking growth pockets through differentiation. Western DSPs have managed to grow with largely undifferentiated product propositions. Music rightsholders should explore creative ways in which they can empower their DSP partners with differentiated content assets, enabling them to super-serve specific consumer segments and thus unlock extra growth within them.

If you are not yet a MIDiA client and would like to find out how to get access to this report and data then email stephen@midiaresearch.com

Churn in the era of dynamic retention

Kantar, a survey vendor, has been getting some attention by passing off consumer data as an actual measure of subscribers and suggesting that the music subscriber base actually declined in Q1 2022. It said the same in Q4 2021, but 2021 was a spectacular year for music subscriber growth, with the global base of subscribers growing by 118.8 million in 2021 – the largest ever increase in a single year – to reach 586 million. Of course, it would be obtuse to suggest that all is rosy in the world of digital subscriptions. After all, the attention recession has slowed growth and the actual recession will push up churn rates. But it is wrong to assume that digital subscriptions behave like their traditional counterparts, which is exactly why music subscriptions are well placed to weather the perfect storm of both recessions.

Digital subscriptions are different

Traditional subscriptions (pay-TV, internet, phone etc.) are slow moving, predictable beasts. Consumers are locked into contracts for fixed periods and must pay penalty clauses to exit them early. Which is why, when churn happens in these subscriptions, it is a big deal. It represents a hard break, the end of a subscriber relationship. But digital subscriptions are wired differently:

• Churn doesn’t necessarily mean churn: Few have contracts, and most are as easy to leave as they are to join. They are built (if not necessarily designed) for hop-on / hop-off behaviour. When someone drops a Netflix subscription, the likelihood is that they will be back in a few months. The same does not apply for traditional subscribers.
  
• Digital subscriptions are less critical: Most traditional subscriptions are utilities (phone, broadband etc.). Even a pay-TV subscription is a utility because the TV set may literally stop receiving signal without a subscription. So, cancelling one is a much bigger deal. But digital subscriptions usually just make digital entertainment better (e.g., an extra catalogue of TV shows to watch, music without ads etc.)
  
• Many are still getting started: Even though music subscriptions growth is slowing in many markets, large numbers of consumers are still trying out subscriptions for the first time. This means there is always a high turnover of subscribers. Even more so in video and games where new services have come to market.

The last point is perhaps most important. MIDiA’s Q1 consumer data indicates that more people signed up to music subscriptions in the previous year (13%) than cancelled (10%) – both figures are as a share of all consumers that either had or used to have a music subscription.

The takeaway is that music subscriptions are highly fluid at the edges. They resemble a duck in water: elegant and slow moving above the water line, but legs pumping furiously below it. We can see this in Spotify’s reported numbers too. In 2020 Spotify added 25 million subscribers to its tally to reach 180 million. But it actually added twice as many subscribers as that before it also lost 25 million due to churn.

Churn is built into the model

Churn is quite simply part of the equation for music subscriptions. But at risk of sounding too Pollyanna-ish about this, there is no denying that dark clouds are building on the horizon. The cost-of-living crisis is accelerating, inflation and interest rates are going up, and wages are steadfast. As MIDiA’s recession data shows, around a fifth of music subscribers would consider cancelling their subscriptions if their everyday costs spiralled. A subscriber slowdown may indeed come. Those that do cancel should not be considered ‘lost’ but instead as taking a break. They will be there, ready to dive back in as soon as they can. 

DSPs will need to think in terms of what MIDiA calls dynamic retention. Instead of being focused on having a subscriber for all 12 months of a year, understand that in the coming economic climate, subscribers will likely require more flexibility. So, think instead of how many subscriber months can be had from that subscriber over a 12-month period, regardless of whether they are consecutive or not. It is certainly a shift in mindset, but this kind of pragmatic and flexible thinking will be crucial for navigating the times ahead.

The attention recession has hit Spotify too

Spotify added two million subscribers in Q1 2022. Yes, this incorporates the impact of 1.5 million lost Russian subscribers and is set against Netflix having lost 0.2 million subscribers over the same quarter. But while Spotify did well to not suffer the same fate as Netflix, it was not able to buck the broader trend affecting the entertainment market: the attention recession. The attention recession is the combined impact of: 1) the end of the Covid entertainment boom (consumers have less time and money as pre-pandemic behaviours resurface); 2) economic headwinds (rising inflation and interest rates), and 3) the geo-political situation (the Russo-Ukrainian war). Spotify’s Q1 earnings provide further early evidence of the attention recession’s impact. Spotify’s earnings were shaped by all three.

Looking at the ad-supported and paid users of a number of leading digital entertainment companies that have already reported their Q1 2022 results, a clear trend emerges: paid user growth slowed in Q1 2022, while free users continued to grow strongly. With consumers having less time on their hands and less money in their pockets, free is growing faster than paid.

Entertainment monetisation trends followed an almost mirror opposite of user behaviour. The first quarter of every year is typically down from the preceding fourth quarter for ad businesses, with the Q4 advertiser spend surge receding. Yet the declines in Q1 ad revenues for Snap and YouTube were both significantly bigger in 2022 than in 2021, with a combined drop of 22% compared to 13% the year before. Snap’s Evan Spiegel even went on record to explain just how problematic a quarter Q1 2022 had been and how there are growing concerns about the outlook for ad spend. This is because, as consumers have less disposable income, they buy less, which means advertisers get lower returns on their spend. Ad revenue is most often an early victim of a recession.

Conversely, Q1 2022 subscription revenues were up slightly, though much less so than in Q1 2021, and Spotify’s premium revenues were down 1%. Nonetheless, the key takeaway is that subscription monetisation was less vulnerable in the first phase of the attention recession. While free services and tiers benefited from incoming cost-conscious users, they were not able to harness the shift commercially. 

As MIDiA said back in 2020, all companies were going to feel the impact of the attention recession, which we identified was imminent following the pandemic. It is a case of simple arithmetic: more time and more spend during the pandemic benefited all companies. Post-pandemic, both of those increases recede, which means that all entertainment companies have to fight hard to hold on to their newly-found boosts to revenue and users, let alone grow. When we made that prediction, it was before the additional elements of economic and geo-political trends raised their heads. Rising inflation is going to hit all consumers’ pockets (with food and fuel prices being particularly hit), forcing many households to make trade-offs between essentials and luxuries. 

Though Spotify’s move to wind down Russian operations was admirable, it illustrates how the impacts of the Russo-Ukrainian war on digital entertainment will be both varied and far reaching, not least because of its impact on inflation due to its disruption of global food and fuel supplies. 

We are living in ‘interesting times’ and the future is always uncharted, but especially so now. 

Why Spotify cannot afford to make it three out of three with podcasts

It has been a couple of weeks that Spotify would be glad to forget – if it could. Although many of the arguments have been emotionally charged and the debate says as much about people’s political beliefs as it does business strategy, it is indisputable that there is a lot at stake for Spotify. Podcasters are its big bet on the future, music artists are the current bet that pays the bills. Both constituencies need to be kept happy, but can they both be kept happy enough and at the same time? Spotify’s big-future podcast vision has been sold to investors, divesting or censoring Joe Rogan would shake those investors’ confidence in Spotify’s ability to execute on podcasts. But it would be more than just that, it would be the third time that Spotify has had to backtrack on a big bet. Once may be careless, twice bad luck, but three times would most certainly not be a charm.

It is worth remembering why Spotify is betting big on podcasts. Strategically, it wants a slice of the $30 billion radio advertising business, and it wants to ensure it is competing in all lanes of audio. But that is more about the opportunity, the potential. There is also a more prosaic motivation: podcasts represent the ability to grow higher margin revenue and give Spotify more control over its own destiny. Rather than be beholden to music rightsholders and face continual calls for higher rates from artists and songwriters (which risks making margins even smaller), Spotify can plot a course to a future where it owns much of its own content. This means both more control and higher margins. Win-win.

Spotify as a label

The only problem is that as a music platform that has acquired its hundreds of millions of users through music, music rightsholders and creators do not take too kindly to feeling like they are yesterday’s game despite still driving the vast majority of the revenue. And yet, it need not have been this way. The origins of Spotify’s podcast bet lay in the failing of their second big bet: direct artists. In September 2018, Spotify opened up its platform to artists to release their music directly on the platform. The labels of course saw this as a massive threat of disintermediation, shook their fists in fury, and compelled Spotify to swiftly backtrack, dissipating the service in July 2019. The irony is that Spotify was trying to achieve the same objectives with direct artists as it is with podcasts: more control and higher margins. The labels managed to get the strategy killed off, but in doing so they pushed Spotify into pursuing what may be an even more disruptive strategy. Competing with Spotify as a label might have been daunting to the music business, but at least the world’s leading music subscription service was still going to be squarely focused on getting its users to listen to music…

Spotify as a video service

If direct artists was Spotify’s second failed big bet, then video was the first. Back in January 2016, Spotify announced that it was becoming a video service. Featuring original content commissioned from giants of TV, such as Viacom and the BBC, Spotify went big on video. Unfortunately for Spotify, its users did not and Spotify quietly backed away from what briefly looked like a major expansion of Spotify offering away from music. Recognise the trend?

Fortune favours the brave

Spotify’s bet-based strategy is both admirable and has underpinned its huge success to date. It is just unfortunate that the biggest, highest profile bets have not panned out. If Spotify were to fail with the podcast bet too, then the consequences could be catastrophic in terms of investor sentiment. But Spotify has to bet big. It is a tech growth stock, and thus its market value is defined more by what it can be tomorrow than by what it is today. Being the leading player in a commodified and slowing DSP streaming market is not the sort of growth story that underpins valuations like Spotify’s. So it needs big dreams to aim at. 

Yet the irony is, if podcasts do not pan out then Spotify will be back at where it started: as a music streaming company (just as it was after the first two failed bets). This would be an interesting contrast to Netflix, which (occasional foray into games excepted) has had a singular focus on being a video service and is still a video service, with no failed side bets along the way.

The House of Cards moment

The likelihood is that Spotify will make a big success of podcasts, and audio more generally –and the Joe Rogan phase will be looked back on like Netflix’s House of Cards phase: a hint of what will come, the genesis of something much bigger, much more culturally impactful, and far more pervasive. But Netflix did not get to where it is without antagonising (and losing) partners along the way. TV networks that had been licensing their content to Netflix suddenly realised it was now competing with them too. By making their shows available on Netflix they were actually helping a competitor compete against them. Disney and Fox took it so seriously that they pulled their catalogue.

Netflix cause ill feeling among some TV networks and became an outright enemy. That is something Spotify cannot do with music rightsholders and creators. Spotify is currently causing ill feeling among the music community by going to great lengths to accommodate its podcast creator community, which is in stark contrast to the numerous missteps it has made with the music creator ecosystem over the years. It can do so, because it has leverage over music creators (few feel bold enough to remove themselves from Spotify), but Spotify (despite being the leading podcast platform) is still a long way from having that sort of hold over podcast creators.

‘Too big to fail’ is not enough

Netflix survived its backlash, not because it was ‘too big to fail’, but because the video streaming market is fragmented, so it could survive without the networks it antagonised (and two of those networks could go it alone via Disney+). The music streaming market is very different – losing labels and artists would simply reduce Spotify’s value proposition compared to its competitors. Spotify cannot afford its podcast ‘House of Cards moment’ to be followed by a ‘Disney moment’ for music. Matters just got further complicated by a major investor now raising concerns about Spotify’s podcast editorial policy – which means that this is no longer even a clean case of managing investors-vs-the music business. Spotify has an intensely delicate path through which it must find its way.

If it does, then third time really will be a charm for Spotify. 

Spotify chose audio over music, but bigger decisions lie ahead

The symbolism behind Spotify’s support of Neil Young removing his music from the platform, rather than Joe Rogan’s podcast being removed for peddling vaccine misinformation was inescapable. For many, this was a highly public test of whether Spotify put audio or music first, and audio won. For a company that still makes more than 95% of its revenue from music, that is a big call. But, of course, in this particular instance we are talking about a catalogue music artist versus a superstar frontline audio creator. Rogan is one of Spotify’s biggest audio bets, and audio is Spotify’s biggest strategic bet, so it would take a lot – a real lot – to see Spotify consider pulling the plug on the controversial podcaster. Yet, that is exactly the sort of decision Spotify is going to have to start considering before long, and if it does not, then the decision might be made for them.

Becoming a media company

Spotify’s audio problem actually has remarkably little to do with the music business, and everything to do with media company regulation. Back in the mid-2010s, Facebook started its transition from platform to media company, pushing away from a pure focus on users’ content and towards professional created media. In doing so, Facebook found itself beginning to face the same sort of regulatory scrutiny as traditional media companies. It cried foul, trying to make the argument that it was more platform than media company and, therefore, not subject to traditional media company regulation. Facebook won some battles along the way, but it also lost a lot too, catalysed by milestones, such as the Cambridge Analytica debacle and Facebook’s use by Russian covert powers to influence the US presidential election. Throughout this, Facebook, now Meta, has fought tooth and nail to try to build a case of exceptionalism and for the internet to regulate itself. But for many regulators and law makers, the arguments do not pass muster. So much so, in fact, that the case for a new, dedicated regulatory body is building, and supported by no other than a former FCC chair.

Spotify’s case is even more complicated in that it is paying for the content in question, making it much more difficult to build a platform argument. Added to that, regardless of how much money Spotify has invested in Rogan, outspoken podcasters around the world will be looking at this as a test case for whether their freedom of speech is safe on Spotify.

The growing regulatory momentum matters to Spotify because:

1. It is going through the exact same platform-to-media company transition that Facebook went through
2. Support for regulation is stronger now than it was in the mid-2010s. Spotify could find itself getting caught in the same regulatory drag net as social media companies and regulated in the same way at the same time, or close to

Fragmented fandom looks very different in audio than music

Spotify’s audio challenges are not, however, limited to regulation. Spotify is learning the hard way that it is far, far easier to serve the fragmented fandom of music than it is of audio. There are not too many people in the world who feel the strength of antipathy towards other music genres as socialists do against conservatives, and so forth. There is no such thing as mass-market political opinion. Opinions polarise, more so now than ever. The best you can hope to address is a majority of opinion, but even that is scarce, and will be equally disliked by the remainder. This is the nature of modern-day politics and culture. Of course, Spotify understood this going into audio – it is why it has both Joe Rogan and Michelle Obama on its audio roster. But whereas having a diverse music catalogue is a consumer benefit (i.e., more choice) for audio, diversity can be divisive, as Joe Rogan’s continued presence illustrates.

Dealing with Neil Young is one thing, but if there is a flurry of younger, frontline artists that voice concern, then Spotify may need to take action. It will be betting that most, newer frontline artists lean towards political neutrality for fear of upsetting portions of their fanbases. Many artists, and their labels, will be asking themselves whether Rogan is too popular within their fanbases to make a stand. The days of the politically active, protest singer are a thing of the past. Perhaps more realistic an option is for artists somewhere between new and old (eg Beyonce, Coldplay) to take a stand, artists that feel confident enough in their beliefs and their fanbases to make a stand while still being culturally relevant.

Time to choose? 

So, Spotify’s future as an audio company may not only be shaped by external regulation, but it may also have to regulate itself – culturally and politically. There is good reason that the global media landscape is defined by three key types of outlet: liberal / left; neutral; conservative / right. That reason is that it is really hard (perhaps impossible) to simultaneously appeal to both sides of the political divide. If you want to pursue the middle path, that means removing much of the sort of content that drives streams. There is no Joe Rogan in the middle path. Which means that Spotify is probably going to have to decide upon a political leaning, even before it feels the heavy hand of media regulation.