Recorded Music Revenues Hit $21.5 Billion in 2019

With IPOs from Warner Music and Universal Music pending and continued institutional investment into music catalogues, the music business is firmly in the sights of big money. The performance of the recorded music business in 2019 is going to heat up interest even further. The global recorded music industry continued its resurgence in 2019 with a fifth successive year of growth. Global revenues grew by 11.4% in 2019 to reach $21.5 billion, an increase of $2.2 billion on 2018. That growth was bigger than 2018 in both absolute and relative terms. Whichever way you look at it, growth accelerated, and – crucially – this growth was achieved even though streaming revenue growth slowed.

recorded market shares infographic

These are the key trends that underpinned growth:

  • Independence is on the rise: The major record labels retained the lion’s share of the overall market in 2019, accounting for 67.5% of the total – down half a point from 68.0% in 2018. The remaining 32.5% accounted for by independent labels and artists combined was up 0.5 points from 2017 and 4.6 points from 2015. Artists direct – i.e. artists without record labels – was again the fastest-growing segment of the market, growing by 32.1% in 2019 to reach $873 million, representing 4.1% of the total market, up from 1.7% in 2015.
  • Big year for Universal: Universal Music Group was the big winner among the majors, growing both faster than the other two majors and the total market to reach 30% market share. Universal also added more revenue in 2019 ($729 million) than Warner Music and Sony Music combined ($650 million).
  • Race for 2nd heats up: In 2015 Warner Music’s recorded music revenue was just 67% of Sony Music’s, and at the end of 2019 that share had increased to 93%. Just $279 million separated Warner and Sony at the end of 2019. Based on 2019 growth rates, Warner would be level with Sony by the end of 2022.
  • Still stream powered: Streaming was again the key source of growth, up 24% year-on-year to reach $11.9 billion, representing 56% of all label revenues. But growth is slowing; streaming revenue grew by $2.3 billion, which was $64 million less than in 2018. The reason that the total market was able to grow as fast as it did in spite of this is because downloads and physical fell by $0.4 billion less than in 2018. So, ironically, it was the improved performance of legacy formats that enabled streaming’s performance to be good enough to drive 11.4% growth. 

Despite the inevitable slowdown in streaming revenue growth, the recorded music market managed to not only consolidate on its strong 2018 performance but improve upon it in 2019. The continued boom in recorded music revenues is accompanied by a growing complexity to the underlying business, with increased diversification of business models and artist/label relationships. Over the next few years continued revenue growth will be both accompanied and driven by business model innovation and disruption.

What UMG’s IPO Means for the Business of Music

Finishing 2019 on $6.4 billion, Universal Music is to go to IPO hot on the heels of Warner Music’s announcement to do the same. This of course also follows the Tencent-led agreement to acquire 10% of UMG for $3 billion with an option to acquire another 10%. Added into the context of a total of $10 billion in music rights mergers and acquisitions (M&A) in the last decade, we have a clear case of capital flowing into the booming recorded and music publishing businesses. The global recorded music market looks set to have reached a little under $21 billion in 2019, up 10% on 2018 (MIDiA’s definitive market estimate will be ready within the next few weeks). That 10% growth was up on the 8% seen in 2018. Investors of all sizes are either already invested in the music business or are looking for a route in, and UMG just gave them a new, very attractive option. But where is all this heading? How far can it go? And what are the implications for the business of music itself?

Looking for a return

The power behind UMG parent Vivendi is Vincent Bolloré. Although he stepped down from the board last year, he helped instigate a share buyback programme that will leave his family the majority shareholder and could even trigger a mandatory takeover. Additionally, Vincent Bolloré remains as a ‘censor and special advisor’ to Vivendi’s chairman, his son Yannick. This all matters because the motivations of Vivendi’s prime mover are, according to investors we’ve spoken to, focused on maximisation of value for Bolloré Group and for investors. This is not inherently a bad thing. The Bolloré Group has invested billions in Vivendi, so it is only natural that it will be seeking a return on that investment. And the likelihood is that Vivendi will only list a minority of UMG stock, otherwise Vivendi – Bolloré Group’s key financial interest here – would most likely lose value.

Why an IPO?

The IPO announcement follows a previous statement from Vivendi that it would look for other equity buyers for UMG. The IPO may well reflect that this course of action has not delivered fruit. But this does not mean the IPO would struggle. Equity buyers may have balked at the valuation and the lack of company control they would acquire. Stock investors, however, have a different perspective. For example, asset managers will be looking to add a profile of asset class that slots into a particular segment of their portfolios. Meanwhile, hedge funds would see UMG stock as a way to directly bet for (and against) rights in the emerging ‘rights versus distribution’ investment thesis. Finally, publicly-traded stock inherently reflects what the market values a company at, not what the company values itself at.

Investing back into the music business

Sales and IPOs during the peak of markets are usually a good way of maximising return. The question is how much of the income from the equity sales and IPO will flow back into the UMG business, compared to profit taking by investors. The same question of course applies to Len Blavatnik’s Access Industries’ proposed WMG IPO.

In its earnings release Vivendi stated that the income from the various UMG transactions “could be used for substantial share buyback operations and acquisitions”. Share buyback suggests further potential consolidation of the Bolloré Group’s relative dominance of Vivendi shareholding, while acquisitions could refer to activity at both Vivendi and UMG levels. There is a strong case for IPO proceeds being reinvested in the businesses of both UMG and WMG. The music market is growing and both companies outperformed total market growth in 2019 – but a slowdown is coming. Both UMG and WMG added less new streaming revenue in 2019 than they did in 2018. Not by much, but the early signs are there.

Time for plan B, C and D

Emerging and mid-tier markets will drive much of the growth over the next half decade, but the lower average revenue per user (ARPU) rates mean that subscribers will grow faster than revenue. So, the record labels need a new revenue driver. UMG actually saw physical sales grow a little in 2019 (due in part to deluxe editions of Beatles classic releases). But physical is not going to be the long-term revenue driver. Innovating in new revenue streams (e.g. creator tools) and new business models (e.g. streaming services that monetise fandom rather than consumption) is more promising. There is an opportunity here for UMG and WMG to supercharge growth beyond the coming streaming slowdown. In fact, MIDiA would go further and say there is an imperative to do so. Larger independents such as Downtown Music Holdings, Kobalt, BMG and Concord are collectively taking billions worth of capital and investing it in growing their businesses. If the majors do not follow suit, then they will lose ground to this emerging generation of innovative music companies.

This is looking to be the time to capitalise on the music industry’s revenue renaissance. Which begs the question: if/when will Sony spin off some of Sony Music via an IPO?

2018 Global Label Market Share: Stream Engine

Recorded music revenues grew in 2018 for the fourth consecutive year, reaching $18.8 billion, up $2.2 billion from 2017. Streaming was the engine room of growth, up 30% year on year to reach $9.6 billion. For the first time streaming became the majority of label revenue (51%), and its growth continues to outpace the decline of legacy formats. Major label rankings remained unchanged in 2018, but the majors enjoyed varying fortunes and the continued meteoric rise of Artists Direct points to market transforming changes that are reshaping the entire business of record labels.

2018 was shaped by three key factors:

  • Continued growth: Global recorded music revenues grew 7.9%. Though 2017 revenues grew by a higher 9.0%, the market grew the same in absolute terms in 2018, adding $1.4 billion of net new revenues as in 2017. Since 2015 the total market has increased by 26%, adding $3.9 billion of net new revenue.
  • Stream powered: Though relative growth is slowing, streaming added the same amount of net new revenue – $2.2 billion – in 2018 as it did in 2017. Though 2019 will see mature streaming markets such as the US and UK slow, mid-tier markets such as Mexico and Brazil, coupled with Japan and Germany, will ensure that streaming revenues grow by another $2 billion in 2019.
  • Artists Direct:The major record labels retained the lion’s share of revenues in 2018, accounting for 69.2% of the total. Changes in global market shares typically move at a relatively slow pace, particularly at a major vs independent level. However, Artists Direct – i.e. artists without record labels – are changing the shape of the market, growing nearly four times as fast as the total market to end 2018 with $0.6 billion of revenue.

midia music market shares 2018

There were mixed fortunes in terms of market shares. Universal Music and Warner Music both gained 0.6 points of market share in 2018, up to 30.3% and 18.3% respectively, with Sony Music losing 1.5 points of share in 2018. Though Sony’s 2018 revenues were constrained in part by the company implementing new revenue recognition practices in 2018, Universal’s market share lead over the second placed label is now an impressive 9.7 points.Artists Direct and Independents together accounted for 30.8%, though this figure is measured on a distribution basis (i.e. Major revenues include independent labels distributed by majors and major owned companies). The independent share based on an ownership share will therefore be higher.

More of the same, but change too

In many respects 2018 was a re-run of 2017: total revenues grew in high single digit percentage terms; streaming was the engine room of growth and added more revenue than the prior year; Warner Music gained most major market share; Universal Music added more revenue than any other label; Artists Direct gained most market share.  But it is this latter point that may say most about where the overall market is heading. The range of tools now available to an artist are more comprehensive than ever before, while deal types that labels are offering (e.g. label services, joint ventures) are changing too. Artists are effectively able to custom-build the right model for them. The market will always need labels, but what constitutes a label is becoming a fluid concept. And in so becoming, it may put us on the verge of the biggest shift in record label business models since, well, ever.

These findings are highlights of the MIDiA Research report: Recorded Music Market 2018: Stream Engine. If you are a MIDiA client you can access the full report, slides and datasets here. You can also purchase the report and all its assets here.

Why India Matters to Spotify, and Why it May Not Deliver

Warner Music and Spotify have been involved in a rather unseemly and very public spat this week over Spotify’s India launch. I’ll leave for someone else, the discussions of the potential implications of a blanket license for songwriter rights in India for an on-demand streaming service. Suffice to say, the words ‘can of worms’ come to mind. Instead, I am going to focus on why India matters so much to Spotify.

The next one billion, perhaps…

Spotify’s Daniel Ek has made much of addressing the next one billion internet users as part of Spotify’s long-term opportunity. Given the fact that China is effectively off the table for now and that sub-Saharan Africa is probably a generation away from being a major streaming market, India is the key component of that next one billion.

Europe and North America accounted for 69% of Spotify’s subscriber growth in 2018. While this was hugely positive for those regions and delivered high-value subscribers – declining ARPU notwithstanding, growth in those regions will slow down towards the end of this year. Next tier markets – Brazil, Mexico, Germany and ideally, though probably not, Japan – will pick up much of the slack. But to sustain the growth rates its shareholders require, Spotify needs other large markets to start building real momentum by 2020/2021. India and the Middle East represent the best options. However, the Middle East already has a strong incumbent – Anghami – and a potentially resurgent Deezer, newly empowered by its exclusive deal with leading local label Rotana. So, India is effectively the last bet on the table.

India is a very competitive but problematic market

India, however, is a problematic market. It has a host of well-backed incumbents – Jio Music, Saavn, and Tencent-backed Gaana – as well as solid performances from Apple and Google. Yet despite all this robust supply, the market heavily underperforms, registering only 1.7 million subscribers in 2018 with a monthly label ARPU of just $0.74. 1.7 million may sound like a solid enough base, but it represents just 0.1% of the total Indian population. There are two key reasons for such weak uptake to date:

  1. Music plays a different role in India:Bollywood and devotional are two of the most widely listened to music genres, neither of which are mainstays of subscription services, nor streaming music consumption in general.
  2. Income levels are low:the average per capita income is $553 a month, with the luxury of a music subscription far out of reach for most Indians, other than urban elites. Spotify’s $1.80 price point in India may sound cheap, but relative to average income, it is 9.3 times more expensive than $9.99 is in the US. So, Spotify would need to be priced at $0.19 to be the same relative affordability as in the US, which coincidentally is the price for its day pass.

The ARPU challenge

The realistic ambition for Spotify should be to drive five to 10 million subscribers over the next five years or so, primarily pulling from urban elites (essentially a re-run of what has been happening in Latin America). While more credible, this falls way short of denting the ‘next one billion’ opportunity. To unlock the scale opportunity, streaming has to look beyond subscriptions, and also beyond ad supported (India’s 270 million free streamers only generated a monthly ARPU of $0.006 in 2018). The scale opportunity is telco bundles. Reliance Communications’s prioritisation of Jio Music makes it the most likely player to capitalise on this in the mid-term.

Spotify needs to find a similar scale partner and somehow convince label partners to accept an ARPU of say $0.08, which would be roughly in line with US telco bundle ARPU on a Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) basis. This would unlock scale without having to tolerate the catastrophically lower ad-supported ARPU rates. But the odds of that happening anytime soon are miniscule. When, and it is a case of when, not if, that time does come, the scale of adoption could be transformative for the global market. In fact, this is exactly where MIDiA thinks the market is heading. In our just published music forecasts, we predict that by 2026 India will have the fourth largest installed base of music subscribers, anywhere in the world.

What matters most, revenue or scale?

The question is whether Spotify can be a major part of the ‘Indian adoption’. Even if it can, the ARPU will be so small that all the current concerns about Spotify’s falling ARPU will look like a storm in a teacup when compared.

Have no doubt, India can, and perhaps will, become a major player in the global streaming market, even helping reshape global music culture. It can also play a major role in Spotify’s future, but the rules of engagement will need to change to unlock that growth, and in doing so Spotify will be sacrificing ARPU. All of this means, Spotify’s investors and partners need to ask themselves, what do they want Spotify to deliver most: strong revenue growth or strong subscriber growth, because India cannot deliver both.

Just Who Would Buy Universal Music?

Vivendi continues to look for a buyer for a portion of Universal Music. Though the process has been running officially since May 2018, the transaction (or transactions) may not close until 2020. In many instances, dragging out a sale could reflect badly, suggesting that the seller is struggling to find suitable buyers. But in the case of UMG it probably helps the case. A seller will always seek to maximise the sale price of a company, which means selling as close to the peak as possible. It is a delicate balance, sell too early and you reduce your potential earnings, sell too late and the price can go down as most buyers want a booming business, not a slowing business. In the case of UMG, with institutional investors looking for a way into the booming recorded music business, UMG is pretty much the only game in town for large scale, global institutional investors.

In this sellers’ market, banks have been falling over themselves to say just how valuable UMG could be, with valuations ranging from $22 billion to $33 billionand Vivendi even suggesting $40 billion. Meanwhile, recorded music revenues continue to grow — up 9.0% in 2017, and up 8.2% in 2018 according to MIDiA’s estimates. 2019 will likely be up a further 6%, all driven by streaming. With UMG’s market share (on a distribution base) relatively stable, the market growth thus increases UMG’s valuation. This in turn increases Vivendi’s perceived value, and that is the crux of the matter.

The role of Bolloré Group

Vivendi board member and major shareholder Vincent Bolloré was Vivendi chairman until April 2018, when he handed power to his son Yannick, one month before he was reportedly taken into police custody for questioning as part of an investigation into allegations of corrupt business practices in Africa. Bolloré senior remains the chairman and CEO of Bolloré Group, which retains major shareholdings in Vivendi. Bolloré Group’s Vivendi holdings will inherently be devalued by a sale of prize asset UMG, which is a key reason why only a portion of the music group is up for sale. But, even selling a portion of UMG will have a negative impact on Vivendi’s valuation and thus also on Bolloré Group’s holdings. So, the sale price needs to be high enough to ensure that Bolloré Group makes enough money from the sale to offset any fall in valuation. Hence, dragging out the sale while the streaming market continues to boom. All this also means the sale is of key benefit to Bolloré Group and other Vivendi investors. It is perhaps as welcome as a hole in the head to UMG. Little wonder that some are suggesting UMG is markedly less enthusiastic about this deal than Vivendi is.

vivendi umg potential buyers

All of which brings us onto which company could buy a share of UMG. These can be grouped into the four key segments shown in the chart above. Normally, higher risk buyers (i.e. those that could negatively impact UMG’s business by damaging relationships with partners etc.) would not be serious contenders but as this is a Vivendi / Bolloré Group driven process rather than a UMG driven one, the appetite for risk will be higher. This is because the primary focus is on near-term revenue generation rather than long-term strategic vision. Both are part of the mix, but the former trumps the latter. Nonetheless, the higher-risk strategic buyers are unlikely to be serious contenders. Allowing a tech major to own a share of UMG would create seismic ripples across the music business, as would a sale to Spotify.

Financial investors

So that leaves us with the lower-risk strategic buyers, and both categories of financial buyers. Let’s look at the financial buyers first. Private equity (PE) is one of the more likely segments. We only need to look back at WMG, which was bought by a group of investors including THL and Providence Equity before selling to Len Blavatnik’s Access Industries in 2011 for $3.3 billion. Private equity companies take many different forms these days, with a wider range of investment theses than was the case a decade ago. But the underlying principle remains selling for multiples of what was paid. Put crudely, buy and then flip. The WMG investors put in around half a billion into the company, but a six-fold increase is less likely for UMG, as the transaction is taking place in a bull market while WMG was bought by Providence and co in a bear market. Where the risk comes in for UMG is to whom the PE company/companies would sell to in the future. At that stage, one of the current high-risk strategic companies could become a potential buyer, which would be a future challenge for UMG. The other complication regarding PE companies is that many would want a controlling stake for an investment that could number in the tens of billions.

Institutional investors such as pension funds are the safest option, as they would be looking for long-term stakes in low-risk, high-yield companies to add to their long-term investment portfolios. This would also enable Vivendi to divide and rule, distributing share ownership across a mix of funds, thus not ceding as much block voting power as it would with PE companies.

Strategic investors

The last group of potential buyers is also the most interesting: lower risk strategic. These are mainly holding companies that are building portfolios of related companies. Liberty Media is one of the key options, with holdings in Live Nation, Saavn, SiriusXM, Pandora, Formula 1 Racing and MLB team Atlanta Braves. Not only would UMG fill a gap in that portfolio, Liberty has gone on record stating it would be interested in buying into UMG.

Access Industries is the one that really catches the eye though. Alongside WMG, the Access portfolio includes Perform, Deezer and First Access Entertainment. On the surface Access might appear to be a problematic buyer as it owns WMG. But compared to many other potential investors, it is clearly committed to music and media, and is likely to have a strategic vision that is more aligned with UMG’s than many other potential suitors.

There is of course the possibility of being blocked by regulators on anti-competitive grounds. However, at year end 2017 WMG had an 18% market share, while UMG had 29.7% (both on a distribution basis). If Access acquired 25% of UMG, respective market shares would change to 25.4% for WMG and UMG for 22.2% (still slightly ahead of Sony on 22.1%). It would mean that the market would actually be less consolidated as the market share of the leading label (WMG) would be smaller than UMG’s current market leading share. While the likes of IMPALA would have a lot to say about such a deal, there is nonetheless a glimmer of regulatory hope for Access. Especially when you consider the continued growth of independents and Artists Direct. All of which point to a market that is becoming less, not more, consolidated.

The time is now

Whatever the final outcome, Bolloré Group and Vivendi are currently in the driving seat, but they should not take too much time. 2019 will likely see a streaming growth slowdown in big developed streaming markets such as the US and UK, and it is not yet clear whether later stage major markets Germany and Japan will grow quick enough to offset that slowdown in 2019. So now is the time to act.

Could Spotify Buy Universal? 

Vivendi is reported to be proposing to its board a plan for spinning out Universal Music. It is certainly the right time for a spin off (always sell before the peak), but a full divestment would leave Vivendi unbalanced and a shell of its former self. Canal+ is facing the same Netflix-inspired cord-cutting pains as other pay-TV operators (and is relying heavily on sub-Saharan Africa for subscriber growth), while other assets such as those in Vivendi Village have failed to deliver. With CEO Vincent Bolloré having invested heavily in Vivendi, he would be devaluing his own wealth. For a man who is not shy of saying that he’s in the game to make money, this scenario simply doesn’t add up. As one investment specialist recently suggested to me, this talk of a spin-off is probably exactly that, talk. Talk aimed at driving up Vivendi’s valuation by association and, at most, potentially resulting in a partial spin-off or partial listing. However, it is not beyond the realms of possibility that a big enough offer for Universal would persuade Bolloré to sell. So, let’s for a moment assume that Universal is on the market and have a little fun with who could buy it.

The Chinese option

It is widely rumoured that Alibaba was in advanced discussions with Vivendi to buy some size of stake in Universal. Those conversations derailed when the Chinese government tightened up regulations on Chinese companies buying overseas assets, which is why we now see Tencent buying a growing number of minority stakes in companies rather than outright acquisitions. So, an outright Chinese acquisition is likely off the table. This doesn’t rule out other Asian bidders (Softbank had an $8.5 billion bid rejected in 2013), though perhaps Chinese companies are the only ones with the requisite scale and access to cash that would meet a far, far higher 2018 price point.

The tech major option

The most likely scenario (if Universal were for sale) is that one of the tech majors (Apple, Alphabet, Amazon, Facebook) swoops in. Given Google’s long-held antipathy for the traditional copyright regime, Alphabet is not the most likely, while Facebook is too early in its music journey (though check back in 18 months if all goes well). Apple and Amazon are different cases entirely. Both companies are run by teams of older executives whose formative cultural reference points were shaped by traditional media companies. These are companies that, even if they may not state it, see themselves as the natural evolution of media, moving it from the physical era of transactions to the digital era of access. Thus far, Apple and Amazon have focused principally on distribution, although both have invested in rights too. Apple less so, (e.g. Frank Ocean, Chance the Rapper) but Amazon much more so (e.g. Man in the High Castle, Manchester by the Sea). Acquiring a major media company is a logical next step for Amazon. A TV studio and, or network would likely be the first move (especially as Netflix will likely buy one first, forcing Amazon’s hand), but a record label wouldn’t be inconceivable. And it would have to be a big label – such as UMG, that would guarantee enough share of ear to generate ROI. Apple though, could well buy a sports league, which would use up its budget.

The Spotify option

While the tech majors are more likely long-term buyers of Universal, Spotify arguably needs it more (and is certainly less distracted by other media formats). Right now, Spotify has a prisoner’s dilemma; it knows it needs to make disruptive changes to its business model if it is going to create the step change investors clearly want (look at what happened to Spotify’s stock price despite an impressive enough set of Q1 results). But it also knows that making such changes too quickly could result in labels pulling content, which would destroy its present in the hope of building a future. Meanwhile, labels are worried Spotify is going to disintermediate them but can’t risk damaging their business by withdrawing content now – hence the prisoner’s dilemma. Neither side dares make the first move.

That’s the problem with the ‘do a Netflix’ argument: do it too fast and the whole edifice comes tumbling down. Moreover, original content will not be the same silver bullet for Spotify as it was for Netflix. This is mainly because there is a far smaller catalogue of TV content than music, so a dollar spent on original video goes a lot further than a dollar spent on original music. It is not beyond the realm of possibility that Spotify will get to a tipping point, where the labels see a shiny-toothed wolf lurking under the lamb’s wool, and with its cover blown it will be forced to go nuclear. If this happened, buying a major label would become an option. And, as with the tech majors, it would have to be a major label to deliver enough share of ear.

But that scenario is a long, long way off. First, Spotify has to prove it can be successful and generate enough revenue and market cap to put itself in a position where it could buy a major. And that is still far from a clear path. For now, Spotify’s focus is on being a partner to the labels, not a parent company.

All of this talk might sound outlandish but it was not so long ago that an internet company (AOL) co-owned Warner Music and a drinks company (Seagram) owned Universal Music, before selling it to a water utilities company (Vivendi), and, long before that, EMI was owned by a light bulb company (Thorn Electrical Industries). We have got used to this current period of corporate stability for the major record labels, but this situation is a reflection of the recorded music business being in such a poor state that there was little M&A interest. Nonetheless it is all changing, potentially heralding a return to the past. Everything has happened before and will happen again.

Who’s Leading The Streaming Pack?

At MIDiA Research we are currently in the final stages of producing the update to our annual landmark report: The State Of The Streaming Nation, a report which compiles every streaming market data point you could possibly need.

In advance of its release in June we want to give you a sneak peak into a couple of the key areas of focus: streaming app usage and major label streaming revenue.

music apps slide

Subscriber numbers only tell part of the streaming story. They are solid indicators of commercial success, but can often obscure how well a service is doing in terms of engaging its user base. That’s why we track the main music services’ active user bases every quarter. But rather than tracking Monthly Active Users (MAUs), we track Weekly Active Users (WAUs). The MAU metric is past its sell by date. In today’s always on, increasingly mobile digital landscape, doing something just once a month more resembles inactivity rather than activity. The bar needs raising higher. Companies like Snapchat, Facebook and Supercell measure their active user bases in terms of Weekly Active Users (WAUs) and Daily Active Users (DAUs). It is time for streaming services to step up to the plate and employ WAU as the benchmark.

Using this approach, YouTube and Spotify emerge as the leading services with 25.1% and 16.3% WAU penetration respectively. However, at the other end of the spectrum, Deezer swaps its top half of the table subscriber count ranking for the bottom ranking for WAUs with just 2.3%. Google Play Music All Access does not fare much better on 5.5% and even this likely reflects survey respondent over-reporting for what has proven to be a lacklustre effort from the search giant.

Streaming music finally returned recorded music revenue to sizeable growth in 2016, driving the year-on-year growth of 6%, increasing revenues by $0.9 billion. Label streaming revenue was up $1.6 billion, finally offsetting the impact of declining revenue from the legacy formats of the CD and downloads.

label streaming revenues midia

The growth continued in Q1 2017, albeit at a slightly slower rate. Among the major labels, streaming revenue grew by 35% to reach $1.1 billion in Q1 2017, up from $0.8 billion in Q1 2016. The major labels respective share of cumulative revenue in streaming largely reflects that of total revenue. Streaming was the lynchpin of 2016’s growth and will be even more important in 2017.

Streaming represented 33% of major label revenue in 2016. That share rose to 42in Q1 2017. Streaming is now the stand out revenue source, far outstripping physical’s $0.6 billion. Though a degree of seasonality needs to be considered, the streaming trajectory is clear. Record labels are now becoming streaming businesses. The independent label sector experienced strong streaming growth also, powered in part by licensing body Merlin. Merlin paid out $300m to its independent label members over the last 12 months, leading up to April 2017, to an increase of 800% on the $36m it paid out in 2012. The streaming business is no longer simply about the likes of Spotify and Apple Music, it is the future of the labels too.

These findings and data are just a tiny portion of the State Of The Streaming Nation II report that will additionally include data such as: streaming behaviour, YouTube, role of trials and family plans, playlist trends, average tracks streamed, subscriber numbers for all leading music services, service availability, pricing and product availability, revenue forecasts and user forecasts. The report includes data for more than 20 countries across the Americas, Europe and Asia and forecasts to 2025.

To reserve your copy email Stephen@midiaresearch.com

Welcome To The Post-DIY Era

I recently took part in the True Music Forum in Madrid, an event organized by Boiler Room. I was on a panel that explored whether DIY is now coming of age with a host of high profile artists, most of them urban artists, bypassing or twisting the traditional label model and still achieving stand-out success. On the surface, these look like golden years for DIY, and in many ways they are, but much of what is happening at the top end of the scale has little to do with DIY. Streaming is transforming how artists view recorded music income and is making it possible for artists to pick and choose what label capabilities they want. But more often than not, it is a variation of the label model that succeeds rather than a replacement of it. This is the start of the post-DIY movement.

Madrid True Music Forum, March 8th-28

The First Wave Of DIY

Firstly, to be clear, DIY is alive and well, better than it has ever been in fact. With labels increasingly only signing artists once they have seen them build up following and ‘a story’, it is becoming increasingly common for artists to spend the formative stages of their careers ‘DIY’, releasing their own music, managing their social campaigns, making their own videos, booking their own tours etc. Added to that, the combination of streaming, direct-to-fan platforms and social apps have combined to make it possible to build niche audiences on a global scale. So it is now possible for a new tier of artists to exist, a tier of artists that may never dent the charts (for whatever they may be worth these days) but that can build solid, sustainable careers by engaging their fans directly. Stalwarts like Bandcamp and CD Baby have never had it so good, while a whole crop of new entrants, such as the much hyped BandLab is emerging to drive the market forward. And of course, Soundcloud, for all its financial challenges, provides artists with a platform to engage massive audiences globally without need for any middleman whatsoever.

DIY Versus Empowered Superstars

That is the DIY movement that will go down in history as one of the most culturally significant legacies of the Napster market shock. An organic, grass roots musicians’ revolution. Now though, we are seeing the emergence of a more commercially minded take on DIY, one that draws on the practices of its predecessor but that combines them with the big label model to take full advantage of the best of both worlds. This new breed of superstar DIY artist enjoys the benefit of fiercely held independence with world class distribution and marketing. They are taking the tools of DIY but not all of the ethos. The superstar DIY artist typically builds a strong brand and buzz (and often, but not always, a big live following) and then uses that as a platform to strike a deal with a major label (or a major label subsidiary company) to get the benefits of major label scale without giving up control (nor masters). This can take various forms, such as:

In each scenario the artist retains large amounts of control (or at least more than in a traditional label deal) but gets the support of world class, global infrastructure and marketing. The artists picks the services s/he wants, like an advertiser does with a full- service ad agency. The label services and standalone distributor models have been around for some time, but now they are being used by business savvy, super ambitious superstars in-the-making. And the artist gets to retain an aura of authenticity and independence.

For those artists that want to push the needle even further, streaming services are emerging as an additional weapon in the armoury. Chance the Rapper revealed that Apple paid him $500,000 to become the exclusive streaming partner for ‘Coloring Book’, following hot on the heels of Frank Ocean’s Apple Music exclusive for ‘Blonde’. Apple is setting itself up as a modern day equivalent of the Medici – the medieval Italian family that was a driving force in the Renaissance through its patronage of artists such as Rafael, Leonardo Da Vinci and Michelangelo. Some time or another, Spotify will follow Apple’s lead. The superstar artist fits this streaming-service-as-label model best because an artist with big potential is going to deliver much better ROI for streaming services that are eager to drive market share and differentiation via original content.

Hip Hop Is Setting The Innovation Bar

Urban music, and hip hop in particular, has become a hotbed of artist-led business innovation. Although hip hop has always had stronger commercial sensibilities than other genres, streaming has brought the business innovation to the fore, ranging from the original hip hop superstar businessman Jay Z and his Tidal service, through Frank Ocean’s Apple Music released ‘Blonde’ to Stormzy’s streaming record breaking streaming success.  And the innovation is happening at the grass roots of hip hop too. As the brilliant Kieran Yates noted on the Boiler Room DIY panel, many UK Grime artists are now signing publishing deals before label deals as a) this can often mean bigger advances in today’s indie music market, and b) there is a perception that this means giving up less control, which in turn empowers the artist to strike a better deal with a label, or label-owned company. This also opens up a world of opportunity for independent music marketing agencies etc who can become part of new, agile teams.

Streaming has been continually rewriting the rule book for many years now, but we are entering a period of even faster change, with many of the more fundamental effects being the indirect consequences, such as the rise of post-DIY. It would be wrong, however, to think of this as a ‘death of the label’ narrative. Because the labels (majors and indies) are being smart enough to be as flexible and agile as artists need them to be. Artists are changing and labels are changing just as fast to meet their new needs and terms of reference. Perhaps, the best way to capture the approach of the new era of post-DIY artist is to go back to Jay Z’s classic ‘Diamonds From Sierra Leone’ lyric: I’m not a businessman; I’m a business, man!

 

Global Recorded Market Music Market Shares 2016

MIDiA and Music Business Worldwide have been tracking record label and publisher financial releases throughout 2016. In addition MIDIA has conducted market sizing work on the publishing sector and research for the Worldwide Independent Network’s (WIN) indie label market share project. Pulling all of these inputs together, along with reports from country trade bodies and PROs, MIDiA has created a recorded music market share model to provide a unique view of where the revenue flows in the global business. To ensure as representative a picture as possible all local currency data has been converted into US dollars at the currency conversion rates for the respective quarters. This removes the distortion effect that occurs when data historical data is retrospectively converted at today’s conversion rates.

midia-research-recorded-music-market-shares-2016

(MIDiA Research subscription clients can access the full 15 page excel spreadsheet with all of the underpinning data right now by clicking here.)

The Recorded Music Market In 2016

2016 was a big year for the global recorded music business, with record labels and publishers reporting growth almost across the board. Unsurprisingly, streaming was the driver of growth, increasing its share of label revenue from 23% in 2015 to 34% in 2016. However, the experience was far from uniform across the various corporate groups:

  • Universal: Universal is the world’s leading music group and that status remains firmly the case for 2016. Universal Music’s global record label revenue share was 28.9%, far ahead of the nearest rival Sony Music which had a 22.4% share. However, despite registering a 2.4% growth in USD terms (1.8% in euros), UMG’s share feel slightly from 30.2% in 2015. As with all labels, UMG had a big streaming year, seeing revenue increase by 56%, though this was just below the total market growth of 57%.  Universal Music Publishing’s market share was largely flat at 16.7% for 2016. Note: Although the Universal market share number reported here is smaller than numbers previously reported elsewhere it is grounded in widely accepted industry numbers. The IFPI reported global revenues of $14.95 billion for 2015 while Vivendi reported UMG recorded music revenues of €4.11 billion, which translated to $4.54 billion, which is a 30.2% market share for 2015. Also please note that a previous post had incorrectly reported a 32% decline in physical revenue for UMG in Q4 2016. 
  • Warner: Warner Music had the best major label performance in local currency terms, growing its revenue by 11% and its market share from 16.8% to 17.4%. On the streaming side Warner actually lost a little ground, seeing its market share fall from 19.3% in 2015 to 18.4% despite registering an impressive 51% annual growth in streaming revenue. What helped Warner’s total market share was the smallest local currency fall in physical revenue (just -1%) and the strongest local market currency growth in ‘other’ revenue, up 7%. Warner Chappell had a good year, growing revenue by 9% year-on-year and increasing its market share from 9.6% in 2015 to 10% in 2016.
  • Sony: Sony registered a US dollar growth of 13% in 2016, the highest of all the majors, increasing its market share from 21.3% in 2015 to 22.4% in 2016. However, Sony was helped markedly by the growing strength of the Yen against the dollar. In Yen terms SME’s revenue grew by just 0.9% in 2016. Streaming revenue was up 41.8% in Yen terms and 57% in dollar terms. SME’s streaming market share was flat year-on-year. Sony Music Publishing (including ATV) revenue fell by 1% resulting in market share falling from 24.3% in 2015 to 23% in 2016.
  • Independents: Independent labels saw revenue increase by 6% but that was not enough to prevent market share fall slightly from 31.6% in 2015 to 31.3% in 2016. However, these numbers reflect share according to distribution rather than ownership of copyright. Because so much independent label catalogue is distributed either directly via major labels or via distributors wholly owned by the majors, the actual market share is significantly higher. Watch out for WIN’s forthcoming 2017 indie market share report for a clearer picture of the indie sector’s contribution. On the publishing side independents had a strong year, seeing revenue grow by 6%, and market share grow from 49.4% in 2015 to 50.1% in 2016. Note that the independent numbers include revenue from leading labels in Japan (the world’s 2nd biggest music market globally) and South Korea (another top 10 market) where the western major labels are minor players.

(MIDiA Research subscription clients can access the full 15 page excel spreadsheet with all of the underpinning data right now by clicking here.)

Just How Well Is Streaming Really Doing?

All of the three major record labels announced strong streaming music revenue growth in the 2nd quarter of 2016. On the surface it is a clear cut success story, but as is so often the case with music industry statistics, all is not quite how it seems.

The Global Streaming Market

First of all, let’s look at the global picture. According to the IFPI’s Recording Industry in Numbers (RIN) 2016 edition record label streaming revenue grew by 45% in 2015 reaching $2.9 billion, up from $1.9 billion in 2014. But even that number requires a little due diligence. The IFPI restates its historical numbers every year to reflect the current year’s exchange rates, which can, and does, overstate things. Indeed, a quick look at the 2015 edition of RIN shows that streaming revenue was reported as $2.2 billion for 2014. So on a non-adjusted basis (i.e. without restating the numbers) streaming revenue actually grew by 31%.

Spotify’s Contribution

31% is still impressive growth but the plot thickens when we factor in Spotify’s contribution to those label revenues. Spotify’s total royalty payments were $1.9 billion in 2015, of which around $1.4bn were label payments, and of those around $1.1 billion were royalty payments (i.e. minus advance payments such as Minimum Revenue Guarantees (MRGs) paid in anticipation of future growth). That $1.1 billion was up 85% from $610 million in 2014. As the IFPI numbers only represent payments in respect of actual royalties (i.e. minus advance payments) the Spotify label royalty payments can be considered as a share of that global total. That share was 39% of all label streaming revenue in 2015, up from 28% in 2014.

This results in 2 interesting points:

  1. Spotify’s share of the global music subscriber total was 35% in 2014 and 37% in 2015. So the label royalty payments over indexed in 2014 and under indexed in 2015. The fact that 2015 was a big year for heavily discounted promotional offers such as $1 for 3 months most probably plays a key role here.
  2. If we remove the Spotify label royalty payments from the equation, label payments from other streaming services grew by just 10% from $1.6 billion in 2014 to $1.8 billion in 2015. Not exactly the most robust of pictures for the wider streaming market place.

major label streaming

So much for 2015, let’s look at where we are now. All three major labels reported strong streaming growth in Q2 2016. Together they reported $918 million, up 51% from $607 in Q2 2015. That growth generated $311 million of new digital revenue. At the same time, and as a direct consequence, download revenue fell by 24% from $925 in Q2 2015 to $705 million. So streaming is now nearly as big as downloads were 12 months ago. The net increase in combined digital music revenue was $91 million, or a combined digital growth rate of 6%. Solid growth, but not far from treading water. This is a transition process, not a transformative growth process.

Universal Is The Big Streaming Winner

Each of the 3 majors had differing streaming experiences. Universal was the big winner, growing its share of major label streaming revenue from 38% in Q2 2015 to 42% in Q2 2016 (boosted more than other majors by ‘embedded’ independent label revenue). UMG’s streaming revenue grew by more than 60% while Sony and Warner grew by an average of 42%. However, it is important to note that UMG’s reported streaming numbers may be skewed more by currency restating than the other majors, so this share increase might be slightly on the high side.

Sony Music meanwhile lost share from 35% to 33% while Warner Music, which was most coy about its streaming revenue in its reporting, also saw a fall from 26% to 25%. Warner’s and Sony’s loss was Universal’s gain. An interesting side note: Sony was the only major that saw growth in physical music sales over the period. Yet more evidence of the Adele effect?

The Role Of Advanced Payments

But perhaps the most important element of the majors’ streaming reports is the difference between royalty payments (i.e. money earned for music streamed) and total streaming revenue (i.e. including advanced payments such as MRGs). Spotify states rights payments are 70% of its revenue though its 2015 accounts show royalty payments as 82% of revenue due in large part to advanced payments. Using this benchmark advanced payments represent around 16% of all label payments. Applying this to the label reported numbers we can extrapolate that $145 million of all major label streaming revenue is advanced payments.

Why does this matter? Because this is the major record label’s streaming reality distortion field. They get streaming revenue regardless of how well the marketplace actually performs. If a streaming service pays an MRG of $30 million but only earns $10 million the label still gets $30 million. So in that scenario the label’s view of that part of the streaming music market is 3 times better than it actually is. If the music service wins, the label wins, if the music service loses, the label still wins. This disconnect between how the market performs and how the label performs is one of the festering wounds of the streaming music market. And its revenue impact is massive. In fact, advanced label streaming payments were 158% of the $91 million that digital music revenue grew by in Q2 2016. Yes, that’s right, advanced streaming payments accounted for all of the digital music growth, and more.

Streaming Will Continue To Grow, But Haunted By Advanced Payments

So where does all this leave us? The streaming market is without doubt entering a phase of accelerating growth and is doing enough to counter the resulting decline in downloads to contribute to a combined total recorded music revenue growth of 4% for major labels in Q2 2016. But growth is not quite as stellar as the headline numbers would suggest, with the single most important factor being the impact of advanced payments distorting the bigger picture and crippling cash flow for streaming music services. Expect more impressive growth throughout the remainder of 2016 but also expect streaming music economics to continue to be fractured.